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What's Wrong with Intentionalism?
Transformative Use, Copyright Law, and Authorship
ABSTRACT. Copyright law's experiment with transformative use is failing. So argue a grow-
ing number of scholars who contend that the standard conflicts with the goals of art. In their
view, transformative use goes astray by conflating the accused work's meaning with the defend-
ant's intent. However, they argue, art succeeds precisely because it rejects this "intentionalism."
By situating the viewer as the authority on the work's meaning, art permits viewers to express
values that would otherwise be suppressed. Consequently, opponents conclude, copyright law
should replace transformative use with various anti-intentionalist strategies, similar to those de-
ployed in art criticism.
Yet despite the prominence of anti-intentionalism in debates over transformative use, schol-
ars have not critically examined anti-intentionalism's application to copyright law. Instead, de-
bates have proceeded in isolation from the broader dialectic between intentionalism and anti-
intentionalism. This isolation is unfortunate. Outside of copyright law, scholars have responded
to anti-intentionalism's emergence by challenging anti-intentionalism's premises and relaxing the
assumptions that motivated anti-intentionalism's development.
This Note argues that opponents of intentionalism are wrong to reject intentionalism out-
right. Transformative use's inquiry into artistic intent protects the First Amendment principles
embodied in fair use. Many First Amendment doctrines and theories require courts to consider
the defendant's intentions in determining her liability for the harmful consequences of her
speech. At the same time, aesthetic and practical arguments against intentionalism are not com-
pelling. None of the arguments offered by opponents of intentionalism would trouble a commit-
ted intentionalist, and appeals to uncertainty are exaggerated. Calls to reject transformative use
based on intentionalism are therefore premature.
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"Considering the philosophic intelligence that has set out to discredit it,




Do an artist's intentions affect the meaning of her work? Should courts
consider a defendant's intentions when deciding whether an accused work is
"transformative"? A growing number of copyright scholars argue that they
should not. In their view, courts should abandon the transformative use stand-
ard, at least as currently conceived, because it relies on an "intentionalist" theo-
ry of interpretation that conflicts with the goals of contemporary art and copy-
right law. Under that standard, an otherwise infringing work is fair use if it
"adds something new" to the copyrighted work, "with a further purpose or
different character, altering [that work] with new expression, meaning, or mes-
sage."2 Since the Supreme Court adopted transformative use in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., courts have fashioned the standard into a flexible in-
strument for protecting creative expression.'
Surprisingly, however, several scholars who otherwise support strong fair
use protections have joined expansionists in calling for transformative use's
abandonment or modification. By equating transformativeness with "expres-
sion, meaning, or message,"' they argue, transformative use assumes that there
is an artist behind the work whose intentions determine the work's artistic
meaning. This assumption, opponents of intentionalism believe, is wrong. Fol-
lowing prominent artists and art critics,s opponents argue that courts should
1. Denis Dutton, Why Intentionalism Won't Go Away, in LITERATURE AND THE QUESTION OF
PHILOSOPHY 192, 194 (Anthony J. Cascardi ed., 1987).
2. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
3. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Possible Futures of Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REv. 815, 816-39
(015); Rebecca Tushnet, Content, Purpose, or Both?, 90 WASH. L. REv. 869, 871-83 (2015).
4. Campbell, 51o U.S. at 579 (1994).
5. Numerous critical schools reject intentionalism as the standard for meaning. See, e.g., W.K.
Wimsatt, Jr. & M.C. Beardsley, The Intentional Fallacy, 54 SEWANEE REv. 468 (1946). Simi-
larly, many structuralist and post-structuralist theorists have proposed anti-intentionalist
critiques of authorship. See, e.g., Roland Barthes, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE-MUSIC-
TExT 142 (Stephen Heath trans., 1977) (1968); Michel Foucault, What Is an Author?, in 2
MICHEL FOUCAULT: AESTHETICS, METHOD, AND EPISTEMOLOGY 205 (James D. Faubion ed.,
Robert Hurley et al. trans., 1998). For additional discussion on anti-intentionalism's pedi-
gree, see infra Section II.A.
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embrace "anti-intentionalist" strategies, which focus on the viewer's percep-
tions of the work, not the artist's intentions.' Although these arguments have
their foundation in contemporary art theory, they apply broadly to all works of
artistic expression.'
Arguments against intentionalism come in several forms. Strong versions
of the anti-intentionalist critique hold that courts should never consider the de-
fendant's artistic intentions. For example, Amy Adler argues that courts should
abandon the transformative use test and adopt a market-based analysis, draw-
ing on critical theory for support." As she explains, "To search for meaning by
relying on the author's intent would be to ask precisely the wrong question, to
miss that the author is dead and that the work is now living its own life."'
Transformative use, she concludes, denies that life by encouraging courts to use
the defendant's intent "as a straightforward way to get at the question of trans-
formativeness."'o
6. Confusingly, philosophers of art use "intentionalism" to refer to two distinct positions. On
the one hand, "intentionalism" refers to the position that artworks differ from other objects,
in part, because they are the consequence of intentional actions. On the other, "intentional-
ism" refers to the view that the artist's intentions are relevant to a work's meaning. This
Note uses "intentionalism" in the latter sense. See ROBERT STECKER, AESTHETICS AND THE
PHILOSOPHY OF ART: AN INTRODUCTION 123-41, 141 n.1 (2d ed. 2010). Some scholars are "in-
tentionalists" in one sense, but not the other. See, e.g., Monroe C. Beardsley, An Aesthetic
Definition of Art, in WHAT Is ART? 13 (Hugh Cutler ed., 1983); Wimsatt & Beardsley, supra
note 5-
Additionally, intentionalism and anti-intentionalism, as interpretive positions, are dis-
tinct from monism and pluralism. Monists propose that each artwork has only one true
meaning, while pluralists propose that artworks may have several meanings. Arguments for
monism and pluralism overlap with those for intentionalism and anti-intentionalism, but
the debates are not identical. Intentionalists tend to be monists, but can accommodate mul-
tiple, or even contradictory meanings. See STEPHEN DAvIES, PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES
ON ART 164, 173 (2007). Similarly, anti-intentionalists tend to be pluralists, but there are ex-
ceptions. For example, some anti-intentionalists are "value maximizers," who maintain that
artistic works should be interpreted in ways that maximize some aesthetic or ethical goal. See
id. at 155, 183-89.
7. Under the Copyright Act, copyrightable subject matter includes "original works of author-
ship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). Such works of authorship include:
"(1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic
works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5)
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works." Id.
8. Amy Adler, Fair Use and the Future ofArt, 91 N.Y.U. L. REv. 559,.618-25 (2016).
9. Id. at 598.
lo. Id.
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Weaker versions of the anti-intentionalist critique hold that courts should
not consider the defendant's intentions when viewers of the accused work
would not do so. In particular, Laura Heymann argues that courts should "re-
conceptualize" the transformative use standard to shift the focus of the fair use
inquiry to the viewer's response." Because all art is "representational" in the
sense that it is a "copy" of something else, she contends, fair use should not be
concerned with "what an author does when she creates -whether the second
author changes the first author's expression in some ascertainable or substan-
tial way-but rather whether the reader perceives an interpretive distance be-
tween one copy and another." 12 Adler and Heymann are not alone, and several
other scholars have criticized transformative use on anti-intentionalist
grounds."
Despite growing criticism of intentionalism, courts have not adequately de-
fended fair use doctrine's reliance on artists' intentions. Following Campbell,
courts frequently ask whether the defendant intended to alter the copyrighted
work's "expression, meaning, or message."' 4 If they find that the defendant's
intentions are transformative, courts generally hold that the accused work is
fair use, even if that work does not actually alter the copyrighted work's con-
tent.s However, in reaching these conclusions, courts have not justified their
reliance on intentionalism, instead appealing to Campbell's formula for trans-
formativeness. Indeed, even when courts have found transformativeness based
on the defendant's intentions alone, they have done so unreflectively, without
ii. Laura A. Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 31 COLUM.
J.L. &ARTS 445, 449 (20o8).
12. Id. at 455.
13. For criticisms of intentionalism and authorship in copyright law, see, for example, JAMES
BOYLE, SHAMANs, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFOR-
MATION SOCIETY 51-60 (1996); ROSEMARYJ. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 1-41 (1998); Peter Jaszi, Toward a
Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship," 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 456-63; and Pe-
ter Jaszi & Martha Woodmansee, Introduction to THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEX-
TUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE 1 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds.,
1994). For recent criticisms specific to transformative use, see H. Brian Holland, Social Semi-
otics in the Fair Use Analysis, 24 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 335, 338-48 (2011); Monika Isia Jasiewicz,
Note, 'A Dangerous Undertaking": The Problem of Intentionalism and Promise of Expert Testi-
mony in Appropriation Art Infringement Cases, 26 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 143, 171-81 (2014).
14. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
15. See R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 467, 488-92 (20o8).
1412
126:1408 2017
WHAT'S WRONG WITH INTENTIONALISM?
considering the stakes of the debate between intentionalism and anti-
intentionalism. "
Furthermore, recent decisions suggest that intentionalism's hold on trans-
formative use may be slipping. In Cariou v. Prince," the Second Circuit held
that courts may properly ignore the defendant's intentions if the content of the
accused work is sufficiently transformative. In the court's view, whether a work
is transformative depends on "how the work in question appears to the reason-
able observer, not simply what an artist might say about a particular piece or
body of work."" Applying this rule, the court found that most of the accused
works were fair use because of observable differences between the copyrighted
and accused works. 9
This Note makes two contributions to the debate over intentionalism in
copyright law. First, this Note defends transformative use's intentionalism
against critics. So far, scholars and jurists have allowed opponents of intention-
alism to advance their conclusions largely uncontested.2 0 Accordingly, this Note
attempts to move copyright scholarship to a more balanced discussion of inten-
tionalism's strengths and weaknesses. Second, this Note describes several strat-
egies that courts could adopt in deciding whether a particular work was trans-
formative given the unsettled nature of the debate between intentionalism and
anti-intentionalism. Although superficially similar to existing approaches, both
strategies provide an organizing framework for making transformative use de-
16. See id.
17. 714 F.3 d 694, 707 (2d Cit. 2013).
18. Id. Significantly, Cariou incited a high-profile disagreement between the Second and Sev-
enth Circuits. In Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7 th Cir. 2014), the Seventh
Circuit warned that Cariou's transformative use analysis interfered with the copyright own-
er's derivative works right by asking whether the defendant's use was transformative with-
out considering the defendant's purpose and other statutory fair use factors. See id. at 758.
19. See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707-11.
20. Eva Subotnik has argued that fair use should protect defendants who intend to comply with
copyright law's requirements by, for example, attempting to create new expression, mean-
ing, or message. In her view, such an approach would further the utilitarian goals of copy-
right law by "encouraging reasonable risk taking that both benefits the public and mitigates
harm to copyright holders." Eva E. Subotnik, Intent in Fair Use, 18 LEwis & CLAlK L. REv.
935, 941 (2014). Whatever the merits of this argument, Subotnik does not address the fun-
damental premise underlying the anti-intentionalist critique-that defendants' intentions
have no artistic relevance.
Similarly, Anthony Reese considers copyright law's historic treatment of "innocent in-
fringers," who do not know that their conduct is infringing. See R. Anthony Reese, Innocent
Infringement in U.S. Copyright Law, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTs 133, 134 (2007). However, like
Subotnik, Reese does not address the role that a defendant's artistic intentions should play
in determining infringement.
1413
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
terminations that preserves reference to the defendant's intentions while avoid-
ing the full force of anti-intentionalist arguments.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses modern fair use doctrine
and the emergence of anti-intentionalism in copyright law. This discussion il-
lustrates the motivations that animate anti-intentionalist proposals and pro-
vides a doctrinal platform for the analysis that follows. As this Part explains,
the Second Circuit's trilogy of appropriation art cases drives much of the oppo-
sition to transformative use's intentionalism.2 1 Although the debate between
intentionalism and anti-intentionalism transcends appropriation art, and even
contemporary art, these cases remain influential, both theoretically and doctri-
nally.22
Part II advances three arguments in support of intentionalism. First, inten-
tionalism is arguably more consistent with fair use's status as a First Amend-
ment accommodation. Many First Amendment doctrines require courts to con-
sider the defendant's intentions in determining her liability for the harmful
effects of her speech. Likewise, many leading First Amendment theories, which
view the First Amendment in terms of the speaker's interests, support the use
of intentionalist standards. Although competing theories provide weaker sup-
port for intentionalism, they have difficulty explaining the First Amendment's
application to art.
Second, aesthetic theory provides greater support for anti-intentionalism
than opponents of intentionalism assume. Although opponents frequently con-
tend that anti-intentionalism has won the debate, the reality is more complex.
Since anti-intentionalism's emergence, philosophers of aesthetics and scholars
in related disciplines have responded by challenging anti-intentionalism's
premises. However, neither proponents nor opponents of intentionalism have
critically examined these arguments. Instead, the debate over transformative
use has proceeded in isolation from the broader dialectic between intentional-
ism and anti-intentionalism. Consequently, opponents of intentionalism treat
21. This emphasis on appropriation art may seem unnecessarily limiting. However, appropria-
tion art provides an excellent case study for evaluating transformative use's intentionalism
because it pushes the boundaries of what copyright law has historically considered to be fair
use. As Part I illustrates, many examples of appropriation art upend copyright's concepts of
originality and creativity because they incorporate all or nearly all of the formal elements of
another artwork. For the same reason, appropriation art challenges traditional notions of
fairness. Accordingly, copyright scholars have repeatedly returned to appropriation art in
discussing fair use's underlying policies.
22. Although many of the cases and examples discussed in this Note concern the visual arts, the
arguments apply broadly. Intentionalism's significance has been debated across different
media, from painting to music to literature. See supra note 5; infra Section II.A.
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unsophisticated anti-intentionalist arguments as decisive, when their status is
much more uncertain.2 3
Third, intentionalism generates no more unpredictability than anti-
intentionalist alternatives. Indeed, the proposals suggested by opponents of in-
tentionalism, such as greater reliance on art markets and art critics to determine
a work's significance, are highly unreliable, and their use would likely not pro-
duce greater consistency in outcomes. At the same time, intentionalism may
not be the true cause of unpredictability in transformative use analysis. The
multifactor, all-or-nothing structure of the fair use defense provides a plausible
alternative explanation for apparent inconsistences in transformative use's ap-
plication.
To be clear, the purpose of this discussion is not to establish that anti-
intentionalism is invalid as an aesthetic theory or that fair use should exclusive-
ly focus on the defendant's intentions. Indeed, as the strategies proposed in
Part III admit, intentionalism and anti-intentionalism remain controversial
within the philosophy of aesthetics and related disciplines. Rather, this Note
argues that there are legally persuasive reasons for taking the defendant's inten-
tions into account in many cases and that these justifications should be inte-
grated into fair use law.
Accordingly, Part III describes two strategies for preserving transformative
use's reference to the artist's intentions while accommodating anti-
intentionalist concerns, in accordance with the unsettled nature of the debate
between intentionalism and anti-intentionalism. Under a "dual standards"
strategy, courts would consider both whether the defendant intended to trans-
form the copyrighted work and whether viewers perceived the accused work to
be transformative. Under a "categorial intentionalist" strategy, courts would
consider only the defendant's intentions regarding how the accused work
should be classified or approached, not her intentions regarding that work's
aesthetic meaning. While these strategies would produce different balances be-
tween artists' and viewers' interests, both would be superior to the alternatives
offered by opponents of intentionalism.
To some, responding to anti-intentionalism's aesthetic challenge to trans-
formative use (as distinct from its legal and practical challenges) may seem un-
necessary. On one popular view, law and art belong to separate domains, and
23. Legal scholarship's shallow treatment of the debate over intentionalism is unfortunate, but
characteristic of its treatment of art criticism generally. James Seaton, for example, criticizes
legal scholars, including such luminaries as Ronald Dworkin, Stanley Fish, Martha Nuss-
baum, Richard Posner, and Richard Weisberg, for mistakenly or selectively relying on litera-
ture and literary theory to support their respective positions. See James Seaton, Law and Lit-
erature: Works, Criticism, and Theory, ii YALEJ.L. &HUMAN. 479 (1999).
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their principles are not cross-transferable. 24 If this view is correct, lawyers and
artists have little to offer each other, both for the debate over transformative use
and in general. Yet, although opponents of intentionalism misrepresent the
strength of the anti-intentionalist position, they correctly recognize that law
can learn from art.
As the case law demonstrates,2 5 judges who make fair use determinations
consider the same factual questions as their non-legal counterparts. They in-
quire into the defendant's intentions and, in some cases, make judgments
about the aesthetic meaning of the accused work (as opposed to some distinct,
legal meaning). Insisting that art and law remain separate, as some commenta-
tors suggest, perversely encourages judges to make aesthetic judgments in a
concealed and unprincipled fashion. 26 Further, the willingness of artists and
viewers to comply with legal norms relies, in part, on their sense that the law is
legitimate. Ignoring aesthetic concerns alienates those upon whom law de-
pends.27 Thus, the view that law and art belong to separate domains is both in-
accurate and perverse.
I. TRANSFORMATIVE USE
The anti-intentionalist backlash against transformative use responds to re-
cent trends in fair use doctrine. In particular, transformative use's collision with
contemporary art, especially appropriation art, drives much of the opposition.
Because many contemporary artists maintain that their intentions are irrelevant
to the meaning of their works, several scholars have argued that courts should
not consider the defendant's intentions in determining fair use.
This Part describes the development of the transformative use standard,
and anti-intentionalism's emergence within copyright law. Section L.A explains
developments in the justification and structure of fair use. Section I.B describes
courts' current, unreflective approaches to transformative use and intentional-
ism. Section I.C summarizes the Second Circuit's influential trilogy of appro-
priation art cases, which motivate many anti-intentionalist arguments.
24. See, e.g., Christine Haight Farley, Imagining the Law, in LAW AND THE HUMANITIES: AN IN-
TRODUCTION 292, 305-o6 (Austin D. Sarat et al. eds., 2010).
25. See infra Section I.C.
26. As Christine Farley documents, a wide variety of legal domains, from copyright to customs,
require judges to distinguish art from non-art and good art from bad art. To the extent that
they cannot make these judgments overtly, they do so by disguising their reasoning. See Far-
ley, supra note 24, at 311; Christine Haight Farley, JudgingArt, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805 (2005).
27. See Jessica Litman, Essay, Copyright as Myth, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 235, 247-49 (1991).
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A. Modern Fair Use Doctrine
Fair use is an affirmative defense to copyright infringement that permits
limited use of a copyrighted work without permission from the owner. Section
107 of the Copyright Act establishes four factors for determining whether the
defendant's use qualifies for the defense: (1) "the purpose and character of the
use," (2) "the nature of the copyrighted work," (3) "the amount and substanti-
ality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole," and
(4) "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work."28 However, the Copyright Act provides little guidance for de-
termining how these factors should be applied, leaving the task of operational-
izing the test to courts.2 9
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has clarified several aspects of fair
use doctrine. Two developments are particularly relevant to the debate over in-
tentionalism. First, in Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Court reframed fair use as one of
copyright's First Amendment internal "accommodations."o In Eldred, the Court
confronted a First Amendment challenge to the Copyright Term Extension
Act,"1 which increased the length of the copyright term from the life of the au-
thor plus fifty years to the life of the author plus seventy years. The plaintiffs
argued that the Act should be subject to heightened scrutiny as a content-
neutral speech restriction." Rejecting this argument, the Court explained that
"copyright law contains built-in First Amendment accommodations," which
diminish the need for heightened review.33 Among these accommodations, the
28. 17 U.S.C. 5 107 (2012).
29. In codifying the fair use defense, Congress contemplated that courts would have the primary
responsibility for interpreting and applying the fair use defense. Indeed, the House Report
to the Copyright Act of 1976 explains that "since the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason,
no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the question must be de-
cided on its own facts." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976). This explanation is consistent
with the fair use defense's judicial origins. Commentators frequently cite Judge Story's opin-
ion in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901), as an early, influential
explanation of fair use and its rationales. For a discussion of the origins of fair use, see Mat-
thew Sag, The Prehistory of Fair Use, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1371 (2011).
30. 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003).
31. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-207
(2012)).
32. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218-19.
33. Id. at 219. Before Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985), the
Supreme Court had only decided one case involving the alleged tension between intellectual
property law and the First Amendment. In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433
U.S. 562 (1977), the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not protect a broad-
1417
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fair use defense "allows the public to use not only facts and ideas contained in a
copyrighted work, but also expression itself in certain circumstances."" Ac-
cordingly, fair use "affords considerable 'latitude for scholarship and com-
ment"' and other expressive uses of copyrighted works."
Although Eldred purported to follow precedent, the Court effectively re-
vised fair use's relationship to the First Amendment and free expression. Before
Eldred, the Supreme Court's decisions described fair use in predominantly eco-
nomic terms. For example, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,3 6
which introduced the internal-accommodations approach to reconciling the
Copyright Act with the First Amendment, described fair use as a market-
corrective mechanism." According to the Court, fair use was a "necessary inci-
dent of the constitutional policy of promoting the progress of science and the
useful arts, since a prohibition of such use would inhibit subsequent writers
from attempting to improve upon prior works and thus ... frustrate the very
ends sought to be attained."3 Although before Harper & Row, some scholars
had speculated that fair use might perform a First Amendment function, the
caster against a common-law publicity right claim (also referred to as a common-law copy-
right claim), brought by a freelance performer after the broadcaster videotaped and broad-
cast the performer's act. Id. at 578-79. The Court stated that the First Amendment did not
protect the broadcaster any more than it would if the broadcaster were "to film and broad-
cast a copyrighted dramatic work without liability to the copyright owner." Id. at 575.
34. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219.
3s. Id. at 220 (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560).
36. 471 U.S. 539.
37. See id. at 549-55.
38. Id. at 549 (quoting HORACE G. BALL, TF LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260
(1944)). Justice Blackmun's dissent in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417 (1984), similarly emphasized fair use's role in preventing copyright law from un-
dermining its own internal aims. See id. at 477-86 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For further
discussion of this rationale, see, for example, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 147-65 (2003) [hereinafter
LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw]; Wendy J.
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case
and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 16oo (1982); and William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 357-61 (1989) [herein-
after Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law].
39. Robert Denicola, Paul Goldstein, and Melville Nimmer each separately anticipated the Su-
preme Court's move toward the internal-accommodations approach. See Robert C. Denico-
la, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 283, 293-99 (1979); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70
COLUM. L. REV. 983, loo6-29 (1970); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First
Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLAL. REV. 118o (1970). Nimmer's ap-
proach most closely mirrors Harper & Row's. Like the Court, Nimmer argued that the idea-
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Court primarily attributed this role to the idea-expression dichotomy.40 Alt-
hough Eldred purported to follow Harper & Row's understanding of fair use,4 1
its description of the doctrine as a First Amendment accommodation was an
innovative departure from existing law.4 "
Second, the Supreme Court embraced "transformative use," which empha-
sizes the fair use test's first factor, as the predominant standard for determining
fair use. The transformative use standard, proposed by Judge Pierre Leval4 3
and adopted by the Supreme Court in Campbell," asks whether the accused
work is "transformative" in the sense that it does not "merely 'supersede[] the
objects"' of the original work, but instead "adds something new, with a further
purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning,
or message."" Although transformative use is "not absolutely necessary for a
finding of fair use,' it lies "at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of
breathing space within the confines of copyright."4 6 Consequently, "the more
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors,
like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use."4
Since its adoption, the transformative use standard has come to dominate
fair use analysis. Indeed, fair use determinations almost always turn on wheth-
er the defendant's use was transformative. In a survey of all copyright decisions
reported between 20o6 and 2010, Neil Netanel finds that 85.5 percent of all dis-
trict court opinions and 93-75 percent of all appellate opinions applied the
transformative use standard in deciding whether the accused work was fair
use.4 8 The only appellate-court decision not to apply the transformative use
standard was an unpublished opinion in which the defendant "relied exclusive-
expression dichotomy was copyright's primary First Amendment accommodation and that
fair use's purpose was to prevent market failure. See Nimmer, supra, at 1200-04.
40. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556. Copyright's idea-expression dichotomy excludes from
copyrightable subject matter "any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
41. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220 (2003) (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560).
42. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, First Amendment Constraints on Copyright After Golan v. Holder,
60 UCLAL. REV. 1082, 1105 (2013).
43. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1105 (1990).
44. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 51o U.S. 569 (1994).
45. Id. at 579 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901)).
46. Id. (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 455 n-40 (1984)).
47. Id.
48. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEwIs & CLARK L. REV. 715, 736 (2011).
Federal courts have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over all cases arising under the cop-
yright laws. See 17 U.S.C. S 1338(a) (2012).
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ly on the fourth factor in its brief.""9 Netanel's findings update earlier studies,
which document a significant but smaller shift toward transformative use be-
fore 20o6.s0
Transformative use's dominance is readily apparent from courts' willing-
ness to overlook the other fair use factors once they have held that a work is
transformative. For example, the Second and Fourth Circuits have explained
that the second factor, which considers the nature of the copyrighted work,
"may be of limited usefulness where the creative work of art is being used for a
transformative purpose." 1 Likewise, in Author' Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust,5 2 the
Second Circuit held that the significance of the third factor, like the second fac-
tor, depends on the extent to which the accused work is transformative. "For
some purposes, it may be necessary to copy the entire copyrighted work, in
which case [the amount and substantiality of the portion used] does not weigh
against a finding of fair use."" And in Perfect lo, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,s4 the
Ninth Circuit found, in addressing the fourth factor, which considers the ac-
cused work's effect on the market for the copyrighted work, that "Google's use
of thumbnails for search engine purposes is highly transformative, and so mar-
ket harm cannot be presumed." 5
Attitudes over transformative use have shifted dramatically with its devel-
opment. Over time, many commentators have recognized that the standard
provides a flexible, predictable, and robust defense, protecting even exact cop-
ies.56 Recently, copyright expansionists have begun to criticize the transforma-
tive use standard as uncertain, even though they once relied on the standard's
purported robustness to argue in favor of further strengthening copyright pro-
tections. Copyright restrictionists, for their part, have executed a similar
49. Netanel, supra note 48, at 736.
5o. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2oo5, 156
U. PA. L. REV. 549, 603-o6 (2oo8).
51. Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd., 619 F.3d 301, 315 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bill Graham Ar-
chives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3 d 605, 612 (2d Cir. 2006)); Blanch v. Koons, 467
F.3 d 244, 257 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3 d at 612).
52. 755 F.3 d 87 (2d Cit. 2014).
53. Id. at 98.
54. So8 F.3 d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
ss. Id. at 1168.
S6. See Tushnet, supra note 3.
57. See id. at 874. For scholarship arguing that the transformative use standard has increased
predictability, see infra Section II.B.3.
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about-face.ss Given these developments, the recent opposition to transforma-
tive use is all the more surprising.
B. Fair Use and Intentionalism
Despite transformative use's success, neither the Supreme Court nor lower
courts have offered a defense of transformative use's intentionalism. "Trans-
formativeness" is an ambiguous concept, capable of being understood in one of
two ways. Courts may determine "transformativeness" either by measuring
differences between the defendant's and copyright holder's intentions or by
measuring differences in the accused and copyrighted works' content.
Generally, transformative use determinations turn on intentions, rather
than content. For example, Anthony Reese concludes that courts are much
more likely to find the defendant's use transformative based on her intentions
rather than the accused work's content.59 This conclusion holds across jurisdic-
tions and categories of art."o Indeed, Reese finds, "in all of the cases where
transformativeness was found based on the defendant's transformative pur-
pose, the opinion's ultimate conclusion was that the use was, or was likely to
be, fair."61
Significantly, courts generally hold that the defendant's use is transforma-
tive if she intends to transform the copyrighted work, even if she does not alter
that work's content.62 For example, in Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol
Publishing Group, Inc.,63 the Second Circuit concluded that a defendant's work
"need not necessarily transform the original work's expression to have a trans-
formative purpose,"64 so long as the defendant intends to transform the copy-
righted work.6 s
Nevertheless, courts have not attempted to defend transformative use's ele-
vation of the defendant's intentions over the accused work's content. In Castle
Rock Entertainment and similar cases, courts have treated the relative im-
portance of the defendant's intentions as the necessary consequence of fair use
58. See Tushnet, supra note 3, at 874-75.
59. See Reese, supra note 15, at 485.
6o. See id. at 484-94.
61. Id. at 485.
62. See id. at 49 2-94.
63. i5o F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
64. Id. at 143.
65. See id. at 142; Reese, supra note 15, at 492.
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principles. 6 Yet, that assumption is not obvious.67 In theory, either the defend-
ant's intentions or the accused work's content could supply the basis for a find-
ing of transformativeness. As Parts II and III demonstrate, anti-intentionalist
arguments against transformative use challenge that assumption. Furthermore,
recent developments suggest that as these arguments gain traction, intentional-
ism's hold on transformative use may be slipping."
C. Transformative Use Meets Appropriation Art
Recently, a growing number of scholars who otherwise oppose copyright's
expansion, have joined alongside expansionists in calling for transformative
use's abandonment or modification.69 Transformative use's collision with con-
temporary art, particularly appropriation art, drives much of this opposition.
"Appropriation" describes the process whereby artists copy elements from ex-
isting works, such as images from popular culture, and assimilate those ele-
ments into their own works.70 In doing so, appropriation artists follow a
longstanding tradition of artistic borrowing. As Baudelaire noted, artistic tradi-
tions often progress through a sequence of copying. Delacroix copied Rubens;
Manet copied Delacroix; and Van Gogh, Millet." Baudelaire, for his part, cop-
ied Delacroix and Hugo.72
Because appropriation, by definition, involves copying, appropriation art-
ists often violate copyright law's reproduction and derivative works rights,
which grant the copyright holder the exclusive right to copy or adapt the copy-
righted work." More generally, appropriation art challenges copyright law's
protection of creativity and originality. Indeed, given copyright law's "insist-
66. See Castle Rock Entm't, 150 F.3d at 142-43; Reese, supra note 15, at 492-94.
67. See Reese, supra note 15, at 484-94; sources cited supra note 3.
68. As Section I.C explains, the Second Circuit's decisions in Cariou v. Prince and similar cases
have contributed to a growing anti-intentionalist backlash against transformative use. See
Carion v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
69. See sources cited supra notes 8-13.
70. For an influential attempt to theorize appropriation art, see Douglas Crimp, Appropriating
Appropriation, in IMAGE SCAVENGERS: PHOTOGRAPHY 27 (Paula Marincola ed., 1982).
71. See DAVID CARRIER, HIGH ART: CHARLES BAUDELAIRE AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERNIST
PAINTING 87 n.8 (1996) (quoting i CHARLES BAUDELAIRE, CEUVRES COMPLETES 1017 (Claude
Pichois ed., 1975)).
72. See id.
73. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 1o6(1)-(2) (2012).
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ence" on these values, one scholar has argued that appropriation art presents
"the most radical challenge to the copyright laws to date."74
The Second Circuit's influential trilogy of appropriation art cases -Rogers v.
Koons, Blanch v. Koons, and Cariou v. Prince -motivates much of the debate over
transformative use's intentionalism.7 s The first two cases involved Jeff Koons,
an American artist whose appropriation of lesser-known artists' photographs
caused repeated controversy.
In Rogers, the Second Circuit held that Koons's sculpture String of Puppies
was not fair use. 76 Koons modeled his sculpture on Art Rogers's photograph
Puppies, which depicted a married couple and their eight German Shepherds.
Rogers sued after learning of the infringement. 7 At trial, Koons testified that
the sculpture was "a satire or parody of society" which qualified as fair use." In
support, Koons alleged that he belonged to a school of artists who believed that
"the mass production of commodities and media images has caused a deterio-
ration in the quality of society."o The Second Circuit rejected Koons's fair use
defense. To receive protection, the court held, a parody or satire must com-
ment, at least in part, on the copyrighted work; otherwise, "there would be no
real limitation on the copier's use of another's copyrighted work to make a
statement on some aspect of society at large."s"
Despite Koons's defeat in Rogers and two similar cases,82 he continued to
incorporate other artists' photographs into his works. In Blanch, the Second
Circuit considered Koons's painting Niagara, which depicted "four pairs of
74. Lynne A. Greenberg, The Art of Appropriation: Puppies, Piracy, and Post-Modernism, 11
CARDOzo ARTs & ENT. L.J. 1, 33 (1992).
75. See Adler, supra note 8, at 584-99; Heymann, supra note 11, at 460-62; Jasiewicz, supra note
13, at 166-71. Outside of scholarship, the Second Circuit's analysis in these cases has tended
to influence transformative use law in other circuits. For example, in Morris v. Guetta, the
Central District of California followed this analysis to hold that Thierry Guetta's appropria-
tion of Dennis Morris's photograph for use in a series of works was not transformative.. See
Morris v. Guetta, No. LA CV12-oo684 JAK (RZx), 2013 WL 440127, at *6-8 (C.D. Cal. Feb.
4, 2013) (citing Blanch v. Koons, 467 F-3d 244 (2d Cir. 20o6); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301
(2d Cir. 1992); Carion v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)).
76. See Rogers, 960 F.2d at 308-14.
77. See id. at 304.
78. See id. at 305.
79. Id. at 309.
So. Id.
81. Id. at 310.
82. See Campbell v. Koons, No. 91 Civ. 6o55(RO), 1993 Wi 97381 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1993);
United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y 1993).
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women's feet and lower legs dangling prominently over images of confec-
tions."8 To create the painting, Koons had copied one of the pairs of legs from
Andrea Blanch's photograph, Silk Sandals by Gucci, which was featured in an
issue of Allure, a women's beauty magazine."
This time, the Second Circuit held that Koons's painting was fair use." Ap-
plying the transformative use test, adopted after Rogers, 6 the Second Circuit
explained that Koons's "purposes in using Blanch's image [we]re sharply
different from Blanch's goals in creating it."8 Whereas Koons testified that he
wanted the viewer "to think about his/her personal experience" with the ob-
jects present in the painting and how they "affect our lives," Blanch "wanted to
show some sort of erotic sense" and "sexuality."8 Although Koons's critical
aims transcended the appropriated work, the court held that "Koons had a
genuine creative rationale for borrowing Blanch's image," because he consid-
ered their inclusion "necessary" to "comment on the culture and attitudes em-
bodied in Allure Magazine.""
The third case involved a different defendant, Richard Prince, but similar
questions. In Cariou, the Second Circuit held that most of the paintings and
collages in Prince's collection Canal Zone were fair use. 0 Of the thirty-one
works, thirty incorporated photographs from Patrick Cariou's book, Yes Rasta,
which contained photographs of Cariou's experiences with the Rastafarians in
Jamaica." Unlike Koons, Prince did not testify that the works were intended as
a parody or satire of Cariou's photographs or the values that they embodied.92
Instead, Prince testified that he had "no interest in the original meaning of the
83. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3 d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 2006).
84. Id. at 247-48.
8. Id. at 250-59.
86. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
8. Blanch, 467 F.3d at 252.
s8. Id.
8g. Id. at 255. In addition to these intentional differences between Koons's painting and Blanch's
photograph, the court cited formal differences between the painting and photograph, in-
cluding differences in background, medium, size, and details. Id. at 253. However, commen-
tators have emphasized the court's discussion of intentional differences, rather than formal
ones. See, e.g., Heymann, supra note 11, at 461; Rebecca Tushnet, Judges as Bad Reviewers:
Fair Use and Epistemological Humility, 25 LAw & LITERATURE 20, 22-23 (2013); Jasiewicz, su-
pra note 13, at 162-63.
go. Carion v. Prince, 714 F.3 d 694, 710-12 (2d Cit. 2013).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 707-08; Carion v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev'd in part, vacated
in part, 7 14 F.3 d 694.
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photographs he uses" and did not "really have a message" that he intended to
communicate in making art."" Accordingly, the district court concluded,
Prince's "own testimony show[ed] that his intent was not transformative." 4
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the absence of transformative in-
tentions did not foreclose Prince's fair-use defense. Instead, the court explained
that whether fair use applies depends on "how the work in question appears to
the reasonable observer, not simply what an artist might say."" Applying this
standard, the court found that "observation of Prince's artworks themselves"
demonstrated that twenty-five of Prince's works were transformative." In the
court's view, those twenty-five works "manifest an entirely different aesthetic
from Cariou's photographs. Where Cariou's serene and deliberately composed
portraits and landscape photographs depict the natural beauty of Rastafarians
and their surrounding environs, Prince's crude and jarring works, on the other
hand, are hectic and provocative.""
Scholarly commentary on these cases is mixed. While many scholars cele-
brate courts' increasing sympathy toward appropriation art, exemplified by the
Second Circuit's decisions in Blanch and Cariou,98 others argue that the trilogy
illustrates the problems inherent in transformative use's reliance on the defend-
ant's intentions. 99 According to this vocal group, transformative use's inten-
tionalism is perverse. In their view, the defendant's intentions are irrelevant to
the accused work's meaningloo and a court's reliance on her testimony yields
93. Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 349. Somewhat inconsistently, Prince also testified that he created
Canal Zone "to pay homage or tribute to other painters, including Picasso, Cezanne, Warhol,
and de Kooning ... and to create beautiful artworks which related to musical themes and to
a post-apocalyptic screenplay he was writing which featured a reggae band." Id.
94. Id.
95. Cariou, 714 F.3 d at 707. The Second Circuit derived this requirement from Campbell's state-
ment that a "threshold question when fair use is raised in defense of parody is whether a pa-
rodic character may reasonably be perceived." Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 582 (1994). That conclusion is questionable. By its own terms, Campbell's statement
addressed parody, not transformative use generally. See id. And, in any event, that statement
is difficult to reconcile with the Court's reframing of fair use as a First Amendment accom-
modation. See infra Section II.B.i.
96. CaTiou, 714 F.3d at 706.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 3, at 871-83.
99. See Adler, supra note 8, at 584-99; Heymann, supra note ii, at 453-57; Jasiewicz, supra note
13, at 166-71.
loo. See sources cited supra note 99.
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highly uncertain outcomes.10 1 Instead, they argue, copyright law, like art criti-
cism, should abandon transformative use and refocus the fair use inquiry on
viewers' responses.1 o2 The remainder of this Note critically examines these ar-
guments.
II. THE ANTI-INTENTIONALIST CRITIQUE
Copyright scholars are wrong to reject transformative use's intentionalism
outright, at least given the arguments presented thus far. Outside of copyright
law, intentionalism's status remains controversial. Scholars have responded to
anti-intentionalism's emergence by challenging anti-intentionalism's premises
and relaxing the assumptions that motivated its development.
This Part describes the debate between intentionalism and anti-
intentionalism outside of copyright law and evaluates the arguments for and
against intentionalism in fair use. Section II.A provides a more accurate ac-
count of the debate between intentionalism and anti-intentionalism than those
offered by opponents. Section II.B defends transformative use's intentionalism.
A. The Intentionalism/Anti-Intentionalism Debate
Scholars outside of copyright law sharply disagree over the relevance and
significance of an artist's intentions to artistic meaning. Broadly, scholars adopt
one of two positions. Intentionalists argue that a work's meaning is identical
with or constrained by the artist's intent; anti-intentionalists deny this conclu-
101. See sources cited supra note 99. As discussed in the Introduction, the debate over Cariou ex-
tends beyond scholarship. For discussion on the disagreement between the Second and Sev-
enth Circuits, see supra note 18.
Some opponents of intentionalism also argue against formalist approaches, which
compare visual differences between the plaintiff's and defendant's works. See, e.g., Adler, su-
pra note 8, at 599-608. This Note does not attempt to respond to criticisms of formalism,
other than to suggest that the transformative standard should be highly attentive to the art-
ist's intent, a suggestion that might reduce the need for courts to assess formal differences.
Still, in some cases, intentionalism might encourage courts to evaluate formal differ-
ences between the defendant's and plaintiff's works, where such differences are probative of
the defendant's transformative intent. Outside of fair use, copyright law commonly uses
formal differences between the works at issue as proxies for the defendant's intent. For ex-
ample, factfinders frequently compare the plaintiff's and defendant's works to determine ac-
tual copying. See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§§ 13.o1[B], 13.02[B] (2016). In some cases, expert testimony assists this comparison. See id.
102. See sources cited supra note 99.
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sion.o3 Within the Anglo-American tradition, New Criticism provided an early
endorsement of the anti-intentionalist thesis. In 1946, William Wimsatt and
Monroe Beardsley provided an influential description of anti-intentionalism in
literary studies. Criticizing what they termed "the intentional fallacy," Wimsatt
and Beardsley argued that the "design or intention of the author is neither
available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of liter-
ary art."10 Because the author's intentions were unknowable to the reader, they
contended, criticism should proceed by concentrating on the literary work it-
self, through close reading and similar techniques. "
During the 196os and 1970s, reader response theory replaced New Criti-
cism as the dominant critical approach. Like the New Critics, reader response
theorists argued that the author's intent was irrelevant to the work's meaning.
However, unlike the New Critics, they argued that interpretation should pro-
ceed by analyzing the reader's affective responses.1 0 6
Simultaneously, European structuralist and post-structuralist theorists de-
veloped their own critiques of intentionalism and authorship. In 1967, Roland
Barthes announced the "death of the Author" and the "birth of the reader."1 0 7
According to him, modern literature had transcended, or soon would trans-
cend, the limitations of authorship by shifting the focus of interpretation to a
depersonalized and dehistoricized reader.' Two years later, Michel Foucault
published his own analysis of authorship, arguing that the author was not a
103. For overviews of the debate between intentionalism and anti-intentionalism, see DAVIES,
supra note 6, at 166-90; STEPHEN DAVIES, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART 111-28 (20o6); PAISLEY
LIVINGSTON, ART AND INTENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 135-74 (2005); and STECKER, SU-
pra note 6, at 145-62.
104. Wimsatt & Beardsley, supra note 5, at 468.
ios. See id. at 482-87.
io6. See, e.g., DAVID BLEICH, READINGS AND FEELINGS: AN INTRODUCTION TO SUBJECTIVE CRITI-
CISM (1975); JONATHAN CULLER, STRUCTURALIST POETICS: STRUCTURALISM, LINGUISTICS,
AND THE STUDY OF LITERATURE (1975); STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE
AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980); NORMAN N. HOLLAND, POEMS IN PER-
SONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PSYCHOANALYSIS OF LITERATURE (1973); WOLFGANG ISER,
THE ACT OF READING: A THEORY OF AESTHETIC RESPONSE (1978); LOUISE M. ROSENBLATT,
THE READER, THE TEXT, THE POEM: THE TRANSACTIONAL THEORY OF THE LITERARY WORK
(1978). For an overview of reader response theory, see Lois TYSON, CRITICAL THEORY To-
DAY: A USER-FRIENDLY GUIDE 161-85 (3d ed. 2015). By contrast, the New Critics held that
the reader's responses were just as irrelevant as the author's intent. See W.K. W'imsatt &
M.C. Beardsley, The Affective Fallacy, 57 SEWANEE REV. 31 (1949).
107. Barthes, supra note 5, at 148.
1o8. See id. at 143-48.
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person but a "function" that emerged during the history of literature. 10' In the
same vein, Jacques Derrida and Paul de Man offered deconstructive theories of
meaning, which rejected inquiry into the actual author's intent. Instead, they
believed, the radical indeterminacy of language prevented works from com-
municating anything other than the impossibility of communication.1 o Collec-
tively, these approaches continue to exert significant influence on contemporary
criticism.
But anti-intentionalism never replaced intentionalism. Indeed, in the phi-
losophy of aesthetics, intentionalism rebounded. In 1968, E.D. Hirsch offered
an early rejoinder to the New Critics and their European counterparts. Accord-
ing to Hirsch, the impossibility of ascertaining the author's intent with abso-
lute certainty did not prevent readers from ascertaining the author's intent with
sufficient certainty to ground a coherent interpretive program.' Further,
Hirsch argued, anti-intentionalist theories were incoherent because without
reference to the author's intent, readers would have no reason to prefer one tex-
tually plausible interpretation of the author's work to another.112
Since Hirsch's response, both intentionalists and anti-intentionalists have
retreated from extreme versions of their respective theories. Modern intention-
alists embrace a wide range of positions. Following Hirsch, "actual intentional-
ists" maintain that the actual author's intentions and the work's meaning are
logically equivalent; but many accept that those intentions may fail."' "Hypo-
thetical intentionalists" hold that the work's meaning is the best hypothesis
about the author's intentions.' 14 And "fictional intentionalists" propose that the
work's meaning is the meaning intended by a fictional, artistically relevant au-
iog. Foucault, supra note 5, at 211.
11. See JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri Chakravorti Spivak trans., Johns Hop-
kins Univ. Press 1997) (1967); Paul de Man, The Crisis of Contemporary Criticism, 6 ARION 38
(1967).
iin. See E.D. HIRSCH, JR., VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION 14-19 (1967).
112. See id. at 24-67.
113. See DAVIES, supra note 6, at 169-70, 178; LIVINGSTON, supra note 103, at 149; STECKER, supra
note 6, at 149-52.
114. See Jerrold Levinson, Intention and Interpretation: A Last Look, in INTENTION AND INTERPRE-
TATION 221 (Gary Iseminger ed., 1992). For critical discussions of actual and hypothetical in-
tentionalism, see DAVIES, supra note 6, at 166-90; LIVINGSTON, supra note 103, at 135-65; and
STECKER, supra note 6, at 127-29. Section III.B proposes harnessing hypothetical intentional-
ist arguments as an intermediate strategy for determining transformativeness that preserves
most of the benefits of intentionalism and anti-intentionalism.
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thor.1 s At the same time, many modern anti-intentionalists accept that au-
thors' intentions may be relevant under some circumstances. 1 16
Outside of philosophy, feminists and critical theorists have defended au-
thorship against structuralist and post-structuralist critics. Nancy Miller, for
example, argues that Barthes's "decision that the Author is dead, and subjective
agency along with him, does not necessarily work for women and prematurely
forecloses the question of identity for them.""' According to her, many in-
stances of feminist literature succeed precisely because they speak from a posi-
tion of authority and subjectivity."' While Miller's view is by no means univer-
sally held,"' authorship continues to hold a place within feminist and critical
theory.
B. Judging Anti-Inteitionalism
Opponents of intentionalism in fair use ignore the complexities of modern
intentionalist and anti-intentionalist debate. 2 0 Opponents offer political, aes-
thetic, and practical arguments. But across each dimension, intentionalism is at
least as viable as anti-intentionalism, and in some cases, arguably superior.
Thus, jurists and scholars should not abandon transformative use's intentional-
ism, at least on the basis of the arguments raised thus far.
115. See Alexander Nehamas, The Postulated Author: Critical Monism as a Regulative Ideal, 8 CRIT-
ICAL INQUIRY 133, 145 (1981). Other theories of non-literal authorship exist outside the de-
bate between intentionalism and anti-intentionalism. For discussion, see TOM KINDT &
HANs-HARALD MfTLLER, THE IMPLIED AUTHOR: CONCEPT AND CONTROVERSY (Alastair Mat-
thews trans., 20o6).
116. See sources cited supra notes 113-115.
117. Nancy K. Miller, Changing the Subject: Authorship, Writing, and the Reader, in FEMINIST
STUDIES/CRITICAL STUDIES 102, lo6 (Teresa de Lauretis ed., 1986).
118. See id. at 106-14.
iig. In particular, feminists criticize reliance on lived experience given their view that experiences
are themselves historically or culturally produced. See Linda M. Alcoff, Phenomenology, Post-
structuralism, and Feminist Theory on the Concept of Experience, in FEMINIST PHENOMENOLOGY
39 (Linda Fisher & Lester Embree eds., 2000); Linda M. Alcoff, Cultural Feminism Versus
Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory, 13 SIGNS 405, 420-21 (1988).
120. To be sure, support for intentionalism is not evenly distributed. As Nol Carroll notes, in-
tentionalism enjoys much greater support in philosophy than in critical disciplines. See Noe
Carroll, Anglo-American Aesthetics and Contemporary Criticism: Intention and the Hermeneutics
of Suspicion, 51 J. AESTHETICS &ART CRITICISM 245, 246-48 (1993).
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1. Free Expression
Despite Eldred and Golan's refraining of fair use as a First Amendment ac-
commodation, copyright scholars have devoted little attention to how First
Amendment doctrine and theory ought to influence debates internal to copy-
right law. Instead, scholarship has concentrated on reconciling the perceived
tensions between the First Amendment's free speech guarantee and the Copy-
right Act's exclusive rights provision. 12 1
Regardless of whether the First Amendment and Copyright Act can ulti-
mately be reconciled, fair use's relationship to the First Amendment suggests
that, as a legal matter, copyright law ought to err on the side of granting pro-
tection based on the defendant's intentions. Intentionalism resonates strongly
with many First Amendment doctrines, which require courts to consider the
defendant's intentions in determining her liability for the harmful effects of her
speech. It also resonates with many leading First Amendment theories, which
view the First Amendment's purpose as furthering individual autonomy or
democratic participation or culture, broadly understood. Although competing
theories provide weaker support for intentionalism, they have difficulty ex-
plaining the First Amendment's application to art.
Opponents of intentionalism often assume that anti-intentionalism pro-
vides greater protection for defendants. For example, Laura Heymann argues
that whereas "a focus on the defendant's purpose yields a conclusion that the
121. A large literature argues that the First Amendment ought to limit copyright liability where
free speech interests are involved. See, e.g., DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, No
LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT (2009);
NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX (20o8); C. Edwin Baker, First Amend-
ment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891 (2002); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to
Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 354 (1999); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in In-
tellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998); Lawrence Lessig, Copyright's First Amend-
ment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057 (2001); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the
First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001) [hereinafter Netanel, Locating Copyright];
Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1
(2002); Ned Snow, Proving Fair Use: Burden of Proof as Burden of Speech, 31 CARDOzO L. REV.
1781 (2010); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and
How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004); Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for
Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Fi-
nance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Tush-
net, Copyright as a Model]; William W. Van Alstyne, Reconciling What the First Amendment
Forbids with What the Copyright Clause Permits: A Summary Explanation and Review, 66 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 225 (2003). Missing from this literature, however, are efforts to use the
First Amendment to mediate debates that are not immediately motivated by the tension be-
tween copyright liability and free speech.
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copyrighted work has not been 'transformed' in the physical or legal sense, . . .
a focus on reader response may well yield the opposite conclusion."122 But
Heymann ignores the opposite case, where a focus on the defendant's inten-
tions would result in a finding of transformativeness, but a finding on the
viewer's response would not. In those circumstances, anti-intentionalist stand-
ards create potential First Amendment problems because they favor punishing
the defendant for the harmful effects of her speech, even though she intends
for her speech to have quite different results.
To see this, consider the following example. Jeff, an appropriation artist,
copies a political advertisement, intending to parody the featured candidate.
Unfortunately for him, viewers do not apprehend Jeff's intentions and treat the
parody as a reproduction. At trial for copyright infringement, Jeff raises a fair
use defense, arguing that his work is transformative. As evidence, he attempts
to introduce his artist's notes, which document his reasons for copying the ad-
vertisement. Should the court consider this evidence? Should Jeff's defense fail
as a matter of law? 12 3
Next, consider a similar example. This time, viewers know that Jeff intends
for his work to function as a parody, but disregard Jeff's intent. Perhaps they
believe Jeff is a lousy artist. Or perhaps they care more about Jeff's work than
his political beliefs.124 Should Jeff's fair use defense fail in this case too?
122. Heymann, supra note ii, at 458. Alexander Motyl's fictional character, Sasha Ivanov, offers a
humorous example of the latter phenomenon. Ivanov is a Soviet journalist, who arrives in
America in 1968, to cover what he believes will be the inevitable American Revolution.
Ivanov is convinced that "Andrei" Warhol is a proletarian genius, whose "socialist realism" is
highly subversive. See ALEXANDER J. MOTYL, WHO KILLED ANDREI WARHOL 48 (2007).
Ivanov's beliefs have some basis in fact. According to Arthur Danto, Ivanov's misreading is
similar to that of European Marxists, who believed that Warhol intended to criticize Ameri-
ca, rather than to praise it. See ARTHUR C. DANTO, ANDY WARHOL 72-73 (2009).
123. Philosophers of aesthetics commonly raise similar examples to demonstrate the explanatory
dilemma that irony presents for anti-intentionalism. For example, scholars use Ed Wood's
PLAN 9 FROM OUTER SPACE (Reynolds Pictures 1959), widely regarded as one of the worst
films ever made, to illustrate the relevance of the author's intentions with respect to the
work. Scholars invite readers to consider the film as a surrealist masterpiece, rather than as
the science-fiction thriller that the director intended, and then reject this interpretation as
implausible. However, they contend, intentionalism would arguably allow this outcome.
See, e.g., NOEL CARROLL, BEYOND AESTHETICS: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 115, 175-78 (2001);
DAvIEs, supra note 6, at 187. For a critical discussion of irony's relationship to anti-
intentionalism, see Daniel 0. Nathan, Irony, Metaphor, and the Problem of Intention, in INTEN-
TION AND INTERPRETATION, supra note 114, at 183.
124. After all, as Neil Cummings and Marysia Lewandowska note, many "art works that engage
with commodification ... become commodified themselves." Neil Cummings & Marysia
Lewandowska, A Shadow of Marx, in A COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY ART SINCE 1945, at
403, 417 (Amelia Jones ed., 2006).
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First Amendment doctrine suggests that a defendant's intentions ought to
determine her liability, at least much of the time. However, the extent to which
this is the case turns on the conventional distinction between coverage and pro-
tection.1 25 Coverage doctrines govern whether an activity counts as "speech," to
which the First Amendment applies, or else counts as "non-speech." In con-
trast, protection doctrines govern whether the First Amendment prohibits a
particular government regulation. Given an alleged First Amendment violation,
courts first determine whether the First Amendment applies, using coverage
doctrines. If the First Amendment is found to apply, courts proceed to evaluate
the government regulation at issue, using protection doctrines.1 26
In distinguishing between particular categories of "speech" and "non-
speech," coverage doctrines place particular importance on the defendant's in-
tentions. For example, the First Amendment prevents the government from
penalizing incitement -that is, activities that tend to promote violence or law-
lessness - unless the speaker actually intends to incite "imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action."1 27 Similarly, the government may
not penalize defamation against public officials unless the speaker knew that
her statements were false or acted in recldess disregard of the truth. 128 And on
one plausible reading of the Supreme Court's "true threats" jurisprudence, the
government may not penalize threats unless the speaker intended to intimi-
date.12 9
125. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 89-92 (1982); Frederick
Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REv. 265
(1981).
126. Of course, even if the First Amendment does not cover the defendant's activity, it may still
prohibit the government from enacting certain regulations. For example, the government
may not regulate some instances of a non-covered activity, but not others, unless the regula-
tion passes strict scrutiny. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-86 (1992).
127. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
128. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). For private figures, the speaker
need only have acted negligently. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-48
(1974). Similar rules apply to intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Snyder v.
Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451-59 (2011).
129. In Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), the Supreme Court stated that the First Amend-
ment allows governments to prohibit "true threats,' or "statements where the speaker means
to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a
particular individual or group of individuals." Id. at 359. Even though Black apparently em-
braced a subjective standard for determining whether a threat is covered, lower courts are
split on this issue. Compare, e.g., United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3 d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir.
2011) (requiring a subjective intent standard), with United States v. Davila, 461 F-3d 298,
304-05 (2d Cit. 2oo6) (citing United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1994)) (not re-
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Similar rules apply to the boundary between "speech" and non-speech
"conduct." Whether a non-verbal activity, such as displaying a symbol, is suffi-
ciently "communicative" to qualify for First Amendment coverage depends on
whether the speaker intended "to convey a particularized message" and wheth-
er "the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those
who viewed it." 30 To meet this standard, the "message" need not be "narrow"
or "succinctly articulable," and may include intentional but non-
representational messages, such as those embodied in abstract paintings or
music. 131
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has narrowed the reach of coverage doc-
trines that do not consider a speaker's intentions. For example, the definition of
fighting words - "personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the or-
dinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to pro-
voke violent reaction" - contains no reference to the speaker's intentions.13 2
However, over time, the Court has narrowed that definition by characterizing
certain actions as incitement, rather than fighting words,133 and by excluding
speech that is "not 'directed to the person of the hearer."'" The Court has also
invalidated numerous fighting words statutes through aggressive enforcement
of the overbreadth doctrine, which prohibits the government from enacting or
enforcing regulations that regulate speech and non-speech. 13s
In similar fashion, the Supreme Court has relied upon the First Amend-
ment to effectively integrate mental-state requirements into obscenity law. Alt-
hough the definition of obscenity, like that of fighting words, does not refer to
the speaker's intentions, 13 6 the Court has invalidated statutes that criminalize
quiring a subjective intent standard). The Court had an opportunity to address this split in
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015), but declined to do so. See id. at 2012.
130. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (per curiam).
131. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (quoting
Spence, 418 U.S. at 411).
132. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942)).
133. See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1949).
134. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940)).
135. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462-67 (1987); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415
U.S. 130, 131-34 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-28 (1972).
136. Under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), whether an activity is obscene depends on
whether "'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;' "whether the work depicts
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law," and "whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value." Id. at 24 (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 4o8 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)).
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the distribution of obscene materials but do not require the defendant to have
acted willfully or knowingly."' It has applied similar rules to statutes that
criminalize the distribution of child pornography. 138
More generally, the Supreme Court's vagueness doctrine infuses a construc-
tive knowledge requirement across First Amendment law by ensuring that the
defendant has fair notice of the government regulation at issue. 1 As the Court
has explained, the doctrine rests upon the assumption that individuals are "free
to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct."14 0 Unless "laws give the person
of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited,"
they may "trap the innocent," who do not know, or at least have no reason to
know, what the laws require of them.' 4 '
In contrast with coverage doctrines, protection doctrines are essentially
concerned with the strength of the government's justification and its connec-
tion to the regulated activity. Content-based regulations generally must satisfy
strict scrutiny,14 whereas content-neutral regulations need only satisfy some
variation of intermediate scrutiny.14 For example, the government may rea-
sonably regulate the time, place, and manner of protected speech, provided that
such regulations "are justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental in-
terest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication
of the information."' 44 Regardless of the level of scrutiny, the government's
means and ends, rather than the speaker's intentions, are the focus of analysis.
Fair use involves questions of both coverage and protection. In determining
whether the accused work is fair use, the court decides both whether the de-
137. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1959).
138. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994); New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 764-65 (1982).
139. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-13 (1972); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402
U.S. 611, 613-14 (1971).
14o. Grayned, 408 U.S. at io8.
141. Id.
142. See EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES: PROBLEMS, CASES,
AND POLICYARGUMENTS 284-316 (6th ed. 2016).
143. See id. at 342-60.
144. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). Similar rules apply to content-neutral regulations
that only incidentally regulate speech. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
Some commentators have argued that the Supreme Court applies a more rigorous variant of
intermediate scrutiny in broadcasting cases. See Netanel, Locating Copyright, supra note 121,
at 54-59.
1434
12 6:14 o 8 2017
WHAT'S WRONG WITH INTENTIONALISM?
fendant's use might merit protection and, assuming that it does, whether the
government's justification for imposing copyright liability, that is, furthering
the constitutional policy of promoting the progress of science and the useful
arts,1 45 is strong enough to justify subjecting the particular defendant to liabil-
ity. However, different fair use factors capture different aspects of this analysis.
The first factor-"the purpose and character of the use"146-most strongly
resembles coverage doctrines. Like other coverage doctrines, the first factor at-
tempts to categorize the defendant's activity relying, in part, on her intentions.
Under that factor, the court attempts to determine whether the defendant's use
belongs to the category of transformative or non-transformative uses.14 1 If the
court finds that the defendant's use is transformative, the court considers
whether the other three fair use factors weigh against imposing liability.148
Those factors - "the nature of the copyrighted work," "the amount and sub-
stantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,"
and "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work"'49 -bear closer resemblance to protection doctrines. Unlike the
first factor, the latter three factors are more concerned with the government's
justification than the defendant's intentions. The more commercially valuable
the copyrighted work, the greater the portion used, and the greater the effect of
that use on the market for the copyrighted work, the greater that interest.s0
145. The Intellectual Property Clause authorizes Congress to grant copyrights and patents to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." U.S. CONsT. art. 1, 5 8, cl. 8. The Su-
preme Court has explained that "[t]he economic philosophy behind the clause... is the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to ad-
vance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors." Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201, 219 (1954).
146. 17 U.S.C. 5 107(1) (2012).
147. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
148. Id.
149. 17 U.S.C. 5 107.
150. Rogers, Blanch, and Cariou are consistent with the conclusion that fair use determinations
involve coverage and protection aspects. In each of those cases, the court struggled to de-
termine whether the accused work was sufficiently transformative to merit protection. In
Rogers, the court held that the defendant's work was not transformative because that expres-
sion was directed toward society, rather than the original work. See Rogers v. Ioons, 960
F.2d 301, 309-10 (2d Cir. 1992). In Blanch and Cariou, by contrast, the courts reached the
opposite conclusion. Although the Blanch and Cariou courts disagreed about the relevance of
the defendant's intentions, they agreed that the defendant's work was not entitled to protec-
tion absent transformativeness. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3 d 694, 705-11 (2d Cir. 2013);
Blanch v. K~oons, 467 F.3 d 244, 251-56 (2d Cir. 2006).
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This framework, which separates the fair use factors into coverage and pro-
tection doctrines, suggests that a defendant's intentions ought to be relevant in
determining whether the purpose and character of her work weighs against
imposing liability. Like other coverage doctrines, the transformative use stand-
ard asks whether the defendant intended to cause the harmful effects that copy-
right law attempts to guard against. To the extent that the defendant instead
intended to transform the copyright holder's work, that intention is lacking.1"'
Leading First Amendment theories also support the conclusion that the de-
fendant's intentions should be relevant in determining her liability. Modern
First Amendment theories, including autonomy, legitimation, and cultural the-
ories, share a common concern for speakers rather than speech. That is, they
emphasize the role of the speaker's interests in determining whether the First
Amendment ought to protect her actions against government regulation.152
Autonomy theories view the First Amendment's value in terms of self-
expression or self-realization.' As Leslie Kendrick has argued, such theories
have a strong affinity with intentionalism because imposing liability on speak-
ers based on listeners' perceptions undermines speakers' autonomy interests in
free and open communication. 15 4
Put another way, objective standards penalize "speakers who do not intend
harm and who are reasonably unaware of the harmful aspects of their speech.
Such speakers have no relation to the aspect of their speech for which they are
being penalized. They also have personal communicative aims that ... are de-
151. Treating transformative use as a coverage doctrine would also alleviate First Amendment
concerns not immediately related to intentionalism. Rebecca Tushnet, for example, argues
that transformative use is a content-based speech regulation because it discriminates among
works based, for example, on whether they are critical or parodic, but escapes scrutiny "be-
cause otherwise private owners would prohibit expression they disliked." Tushnet, Copyright
as a Model, supra.note 121, at 25-27. If transformative use is instead conceived of as a coverage
doctrine, however, the problem of whether transformative use would survive strict scrutiny
falls away, at least in formal, doctrinal terms. On that conception, transformative use would
not discriminate between different categories of speech, but would rather track the bounda-
ry between speech and non-speech.
152. Unfortunately, Eldred and Golan offer little guidance in deciding which First Amendment
theory to choose. Eldred states that the First Amendment "protects the freedom to make -or
decline to make-one's own speech." Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003). However,
although that statement is consistent with many of the theories discussed below, its brevity
makes it difficult to draw any significant conclusions. Golan's discussion of the First
Amendment, although lengthier, is likewise uninformative on the issue. See Golan v. Holder,
565 U.S. 302, 327-35 (2012).
153. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 254 (2011);
Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591, 618 (1982).
154. See Leslie Kendrick, Free Speech and Guilty Minds, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1255, 1278-95 (2014).
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serving of respect. Accordingly, speakers and listeners "generally have a
claim against purposeful interference" with speech, unless "interference is oth-
erwise justified" by an overriding public interest.156 Conversely, "speakers who
intend to cause harm forfeit a claim against purposeful interference" by virtue
of that intention.IS 7 But "where purposeful interference is otherwise justified,
speakers still have a claim not to be held strictly liable for their messages."ss
The autonomy-based account offers a normative foundation for the doctri-
nal principles described above. It explains why, for example, governments may
not penalize inflammatory speech, unless that speech is actually likely to cause
incitement," 9 or libel, unless the speaker acts intentionally or recklessly with
regard to the truth. 6 0 It also explains why transformative use ought to respect
the defendant's intentions. Imposing liability on the defendant based on view-
ers' perceptions alone would violate the defendant's autonomy to determine the
significance of her actions. Conversely, imposing liability on a defendant who
intends to create a competing product, instead of transforming the original
work, would not violate the defendant's autonomy. Such a defendant "forfeits"
her claim against purposeful interference with her speech. Further, if the de-
fendant intends to create an infringing work for purely commercial reasons, the
need to protect personal communicative aims is much reduced.
Kendrick's account also illustrates intentionalism's flexibility. For example,
intentionalism need not be limited to instances in which a defendant acts "in-
tentionally," as that term is used in criminal law.' 6' "It is possible ... that where
speech poses a real and serious harm, and the speaker's mental state encom-
passes that risk, the conditions for purposeful interference have been met."162
Thus, intentionalism can embrace instances in which the defendant acts know-
ingly or recldessly as to the consequences of her actions. Accordingly, inten-
tionalism might permit liability for repeat offenders, such as Koons, who have
been notified that their form of expression constitutes infringement. By con-
trast, instances in which the defendant merely acts negligently would not be
subject to liability because notice would not be present.
155. Id. at 1281-82.
156. Id. at 1284.
157. Id. at 1291.
15. Id.
159. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
16o. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
161. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 1.13(12), 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
162. Kendrick, supra note 154, at 1290.
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Of course, the defendant's autonomy interest in avoiding government in-
terference with her speech must be weighed against competing autonomy in-
terests, such as a viewer's interest in independently interpreting the accused
workl63 or the copyright owner's interest in preserving the integrity of her
work from unauthorized use. 164 However, to the extent that the defendant's au-
tonomy interests conflict with others', fair use arguably ought to treat the for-
mer as legally decisive. In copyright infringement cases, defendants, viewers,
and copyright holders do not occupy equivalent positions. If the court decides
that the accused work is not fair use, the defendant may be subject to coercive
punishment; and the accused work, destroyed. 165 But if the court reaches the
opposite conclusion, viewers remain free to attribute to the accused work any
meaning or significance they choose, unconstrained by the court's judgment.
Likewise, the existence of the copyrighted work remains unaffected.166 Moreo-
ver, imposing copyright liability on the defendant may discourage other artists
from creating works in the future. Thus, treating defendants' autonomy inter-
ests as decisive may, at least in some cases, further viewers' long-term autono-
my interests, even if it seems to undermine their short-term ones.
Legitimation theories support intentionalism for similar reasons. Unlike
autonomy theories, legitimation theories hold that the First Amendment pro-
tects speakers' rights to "experience the value of self-government" by "partici-
pating in the formation of public opinion" within the political sphere.' Yet,
163. See Heymann, supra note 11, at 453-57.
164. Many countries, and in particular, European civil-law countries, recognize a copyright hold-
er's "moral rights" to protect her work against mutilation or other actions that would un-
dermine her personhood interests as embodied in that work. See, e.g., CODE DE LA PROPRIETE
INTELLECTUELLE [C. PROPR. INTELL.] [CODE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY] arts. L121-1 to
L121-9 (Fr.); URHEBERRECHTSGESETZ [URHG] [COPYRIGHT ACT], Sept. 9, 1965, BUN-
DESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL 1] at 1273, arts. 12-14 (Ger.); Berne Convention for the Protec-
tion of Literary and Artistic Works art. 6bis, opened for signature Sept. 9, 1886, revised July 24,
1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 31. The United States recognizes moral rights in visual works only. See
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA), 17 U.S.C. § io6A (2012).
165. For example, in Cariou, the district court ordered Prince to turn over the infringing paint-
ings to Carion for impounding, destruction, or a disposition of Cariou's choice. See Cariou v.
Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev'd in part, vacated in part, 714 F.3 d 694 (2d
Cit. 2013).
166. Of course, finding for the defendant may affect the reception of the copyrighted work. But
that is unremarkable. Indeed, fair use contemplates that the copyright owner's work may be
used for purposes that she strongly disapproves, despite her relationship to the copyrighted
work. Indeed, fair use provides strong protections for parody and other critical uses that run
sharply counter to the copyright owner's interests in controlling the reception of her work.
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 51o U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
167. Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 483 (2011).
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like autonomy theories, legitimation theories emphasize the speakers' interests
in speaking, rather than the effects of her speech. As Robert Post explains, de-
mocracy requires "a certain relationship between persons and their govern-
ment. Democracy is achieved when those who are subject to law believe that
they are also potential authors of law."168 Because citizens must "have access to
the public sphere so that they can participate in the formation of public opin-
ion," legitimation theories treat speakers "as autonomous in many of the ways
that autonomy theory would predict."169
Consequently, legitimation theories suggest that fair use ought to consider
the defendant's intentions to the extent that she attempts to contribute to pub-
lic discourse. Much of copyright's subject matter would meet that requirement,
even if it were not narrowly political in the traditional sense. As Post explains,
"Art and other forms of no[n]cognitive, nonpolitical speech fit comfortably
within the scope of public discourse" because they belong to a sociological cat-
egory that we recognize as strong contributors to public opinion.170 Given this,
fair use ought to consider the defendant's intentions in most cases. Banishing
the defendant's intentions from the fair use inquiry would undermine the legit-
imating function that the First Amendment serves, preventing the defendant
from experiencing what she perceives to be democratic participation, even if
that perception were not shared by viewers."
Cultural theories yield similar conclusions. According to Jack Balkin, the
First Amendment protects and promotes a democratic culture "in which indi-
viduals have a fair opportunity to participate in the forms of meaning-making
that constitute them as individuals."172 Such meaning-making includes popular
art and other forms of expression traditionally considered outside of the do-
main of politics."' As with autonomy and legitimation theories, cultural theo-
ries provide strong support for intentionalism. Anti-intentionalist standards
168. Id. at 482.
169. Id. at 482-83.
170. Id. at 486; see also ROBERT POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 1-25 (2012) (discussing First
Amendment jurisprudence in the context of speech categorized as public discourse).
171. As with autonomy theories, opponents of intentionalism might argue that consideration of
the defendant's intentions would undermine viewers' and copyright owners' competing in-
terests in contributing to the formation of public opinion. But again, intentionalism does
not jeopardize viewers' and copyright owners' interests to the same extent that anti-
intentionalism does artists'. See supra notes 163-166 and accompanying text.
172. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for
the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 3 (2004).
173. See id. at 31-42.
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deny defendants the opportunity to engage in meaning-making by insisting
that they accept the meanings proposed by copyright owners and viewers. 1 74
Not all First Amendment theories support intentionalism. Following Alex-
ander Meildejohn, self-governance theories view the First Amendment as em-
bodying the principle that citizens "shall govern themselves" by ensuring that
"citizens shall, so far as possible, understand the issues which bear on common
life."'7 s Because self-governance theories view speech instrumentally, as a
means for promoting traditional democratic institutions, they emphasize the
public effects of speech, rather than speakers' reasons for speaking. Similarly,
marketplace theories view the First Amendment as an epistemological device
for establishing the truth and falsity of competing ideas.1 76 Like self-
governance theories, marketplace theories provide little inherent support for
intentionalism because they emphasize the effects of speech, potentially at the
expense of speakers.
However, self-governance and marketplace theories face severe explanatory
difficulties when applied to fair use and copyrightable subject matter. In partic-
ular, they are difficult to square with the Supreme Court's conclusion that the
First Amendment "unquestionably" covers art."' In declaring that the First
Amendment covers even art without a "succinctly articulable message," 7  the
Court has apparently placed little importance on whether a particular work
promotes democracy or truth.1 79
Anticipating these difficulties, self-governance theorists have attempted to
ground First Amendment coverage of art within traditional democratic princi-
ples. For example, Meildejohn argued that self-governance theories were con-
sistent with First Amendment coverage for art because, he believed, literature
and other art forms encouraged voters to develop a "sensitive and informed
174. Jed Rubenfeld offers yet another theoretical approach consistent with intentionalism.
Rubenfeld argues that the First Amendment guarantees a "freedom of imagination;' under
which "no one can be penalized for imagining or for communicating what he imagines."
Rubenfeld, supra note 121, at 4. Like autonomy, legitimation, and cultural theories, Ruben-
feld's freedom of imagination would require courts to consider the defendant's mental state,
even if it is not apparent to others.
175. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEO-
PLE 75 (1960).
176. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("[M]en ... may come to believe . . . that the best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground up-
on which their wishes safely can be carried out.").
177. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).
178. Id.
179. See Mark Tushnet, Art and the First Amendment, 35 COLUM. J.L. &ARTS 169, 209-10 (2012).
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appreciation and response to the values out of which the riches of the general
welfare are created."180 However, attempts to reconcile self-governance theories
with the First Amendment's coverage of art have failed to persuade many mod-
ern scholars.
In particular, Meildejohn's account runs into two related obstacles. First,
the premise that art, as a category, encourages sensitivity to democratic values
is highly dubious. As Richard Posner has forcefully argued, art and politics
serve different masters. Some works teach democratic values; others, the oppo-
site. Still others have no relationship to democratic values at all. Hence, exam-
ples of illiberal aesthetes and boorish liberals abound."' Second, and relatedly,
art's encouragement of democratic values does not appear to track our intui-
tions about which works ought to be protected. Some works are profoundly
undemocratic, yet neither the Supreme Court18 2 nor commentators1 8 3 have
been willing to exclude them from First Amendment coverage on that basis.
Marketplace theories fail for similar reasons. Many works, especially those
produced by contemporary artists, do not attempt to express truth, at least in
the sense envisioned by marketplace theorists.184 And to the extent that works
do express truth, their entitlement to protection does not seem to turn on that
fact. Thus, although self-governance and marketplace theories oppose inten-
tionalist standards because of their emphasis on speech, they are less compel-
ling than the intentionalist-friendly theories discussed above, at least in the
context of copyright.
2. Aesthetics
Aside from their free expression concerns, opponents of intentionalism also
argue that inquiry into the defendant's intentions undermines the aesthetic
goals of contemporary art. For example, opponents argue that an artist's inten-
tions are irrelevant to interpretation because many contemporary artworks
180. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 257. For
similar arguments, see MARTi-A C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION
AND PUBLIC LIFE (1995); and ELAINE SCARRY, ON BEAUTY AND BEING JUST 55-124 (1999).
181. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAw AND LITERATURE 456-81 (3d ed. 2009); Richard A. Posner,
Against Ethical Criticism, 21 PHIL. & LITERATURE 1 (1997).
182. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569.
183. See, e.g., Post, supra note 167, at 486.
184. Philosophers sharply disagree over whether propositional statements about fictional entities
can be true of false, much less whether non-propositional works, such as abstract art, can be
true. See SAUL KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY 156-58 (1980); David Lewis, Truth in Fiction,
15 AM. PHIL. Q. 37 (1978).
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have no artist or many artists. That is, many contemporary artworks emerge
from the independent creative activities of a multiplicity of artists, critics, view-
ers, and others, none of whom has an exclusive claim to the meaning of those
works.1 8 5 Moreover, even when individual artists do exercise significant control
over the work, they may be "unaware" of their intentions or create works by
"accident" or while "unconscious."1 8 6 Given this, they conclude, an artist's in-
tentions provide only an incomplete, and fallible, basis for interpretation.'
However, each of these arguments is dubious, especially when applied to trans-
formative use.
The problem of "multiple authorship" is not unique to fair use. Courts
commonly confront situations in which multiple actors participate in the joint
commission of an offense, even though some actors may not perform all the el-
ements of that offense. " In the same vein, legal and philosophical accounts of
"joint authorship," which describe situations in which multiple actors contrib-
ute to the creation of individual works, might permit courts to impose liability
on artists based on their contributions to the collective creative process."' Alt-
hough individual actors may have incomplete or conflicting intentions, the
process of collaboration requires them to harmonize their actions in some fash-
ion. From this harmonization, interpreters could infer a common purpose and
impute that purpose to individual actors."'
Within copyright law, inferring individual intentions from collective ac-
tions is a familiar exercise. For example, as Shyamkrishna Balganesh has noted,
185. See Adler, supra note 8, at 589-99; Heymann, supra note 11, at 453-57; Jasciewicz, supra note
13, at 167-68.
186. Adler, supra note 8, at 590.
187. See sources cited supra note 85. In addition, Heymann appears to reject intentionalism on
logical grounds. Because all art is "representational" in the sense that it is a "copy" of some-
thing else, she argues, fair use should not be concerned with what "an author does when she
creates -whether the second author changes the first author's expression in some ascertain-
able or substantial way-but rather whether the reader perceives an interpretive distance be-
tween one copy and another." Heymann, supra note ii, at 455. But Heymann's conclusion
does not follow from her premise. Even if all art is representational, this does not necessarily
mean that the viewer's perceptions, and not the artist's intentions, determine a work's mean-
ing. For her argument to be valid, Heymann must implicitly rely on anti-intentionalist ar-
guments of the kind described above. See id. at 454-55-
188. In criminal law, inchoate offenses, such as attempt, solicitation, and conspiracy commonly
apply in these situations. See MODEL PENAL CODE §5 5.01-03 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
18g. See LIVINGSTON, supra note 103, at 75-89. Concepts of joint authorship are grounded in
broader philosophical theories of collective action. See, e.g., MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, FACES OF
INTENTION: SELECTED ESSAYS ON INTENTION AND AGENCY 93-108 (1999).
190. See LIVINGSTON, supra note 103, at 75-89.
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courts determine whether parties are coauthors by analyzing their observable
behavior. Specifically, to determine coauthorship in the absence of an express
agreement, "courts began looking to the very process of collaboration and the
parties' behavior therein (as it unfolds during the collaboration) in order to
treat the parties as coauthors of the work, based entirely on their actions."192
Based on their observations, courts may treat parties as coauthors even though
no formal agreement governs their collaboration." In a similar fashion, courts
could make intentionalist judgments about trangformativeness despite the col-
laborative, and even spontaneous, character of contemporary art.1 94
Additionally, appeals to the incompleteness or fallibility of artists' inten-
tions do not adequately differentiate between different kinds of intentions. As
Jerold Levinson's theory of "semantic" and "categorial" intentions illustrates,
some intentions are much more likely to be present, and much less likely to fail,
than others. Semantic intentions are the artist's intentions "to mean something
in or by" a particular work, while categorial intentions are her intentions for
the work "to be classified or taken in some specific or general way." 9 s That is,
categorial intentions "involve the maker's conception of what he has produced
and what it is for, on a rather basic level; they govern not what a work is to
mean but how it is to be fundamentally conceived or approached."'9 6
Unlike semantic intentions, categorial intentions are almost always present
and almost never fail. For example, an artist may not intend for viewers to per-
ceive a particular message in a given work, or if she does, may fail to achieve
that intention. But she will almost certainly intend for the work to be perceived
as an example of a particular genre or, at least, as art, and that intention will
almost certainly succeed."' Given this, Levinson concludes, interpreters can
rely on categorial intentions to "determine how a text is to be conceptualized
191. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Unplanned Coauthorship, 1oo VA. L. REV. 1683 (2014).
192. Id. at 1686.
193. See id.
194. None of the examples of multiple authorship described by opponents of intentionalism un-
dermine these principles. Corporate studios, such as Andy Warhol Enterprises, which or-
ganize the activities of numerous assistants, see Adler, supra note 8, at 592, exemplify the
process of harmonization that characterizes joint-authorship situations. Similarly, photo-
graphic editing, see id. at 594-99, can be understood in terms of joint authorship. To the ex-
tent that the photographer and the editor engage in a common enterprise, interpreters can
plausibly infer a common purpose from their actions; to the extent that they act inde-
pendently, the editor's intentions would supersede the photographer's.
195. JERROLD LEVINSON, THE PLEASURES OF AESTHETICS: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 188 (1996).
196. Id.
197. Levinson, supra note 114, at 232.
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and approached on a fundamental level and thus indirectly affect what it will
resultingly say or express." 98
Accordingly, even if a defendant has no semantic intentions with respect to
the accused work-that is, she does not intend for viewers to perceive a particu-
lar message in that work -she will likely have categorial intentions relevant to
its transformativeness. For example, the defendant may intend for the work to
be perceived as belonging a particular genre or to be displayed in a particular
location or to a particular community. Thus, even if opponents of intentional-
ism are correct in arguing that artists' semantic intentions are incomplete or
fallible, this would not prevent courts from judging the categorial intentions
that are present and realized.
Furthermore, even if artists' intentions were systematically fallible, courts
could still coherently analyze them in determining transformativeness. Oppo-
nents of intentionalism assume that the standard requires courts to judge only
those intentions that are realized in the accused work. But that assumption is
questionable. By its own terms, the standard focuses on "uses" rather than
"works""' That is, courts sometimes terminate the fair use inquiry after find-
ing that the defendant's intended meaning was transformative, without further
determining whether the accused work actually has that meaning.200 Thus, the
fallibility of artists' intentions does not prevent their use in determining trans-
formativeness.2
198. Id. at 233. Indeed, some courts do rely on the defendant's categorial intentions, such as the
defendant's choice to stage her work in a particular gallery, in determining whether her work
is transformative. See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cit. 20o6) (noting that the
defendant's work was "commissioned for exhibition in a German art-gallery space").
199. Admittedly, the canonical formulation-whether the defendant's work "adds something
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression,
meaning, or message" -refers to "works," not "uses." Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
51o U.S. 569, 579 (1994). Taken in isolation, this might suggest that transformative use de-
pends on formal differences between the works, see supra note loi, not the defendant's inten-
tions. In practice, however, courts often use "meaning" as a shorthand for "intended mean-
ing."
200. In Blanch, for example, the court held that Koons's painting was fair use because his "pur-
poses" in using Blanch's photograph were "sharply different" from the photographer's. 467
F.3 d at 252. Although the court subsequently discussed the work's "meaning,' the court did
not attempt to determine whether the painting's actual meaning departed from Koons's in-
tended meaning, or even how viewers would or should respond. Id. at 253.
2o. Outside of fair use, courts in infringement cases frequently consider the defendant's inten-
tions without conflating those intentions with her work's meaning. Statutory damages
awards provide a straightforward example of the principle that anti-intentionalism does not
imply that courts should never inquire into the artist's intent. The Copyright Act authorizes
courts to increase statutory damages if the defendant "willfully" infringed the plaintiff's
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Notwithstanding this, it is unlikely that artists actually are completely una-
ware of their intentions. Anti-intentionalists commonly propose Surrealism's
"automatic writing" as an example of an utterly unintentional creative activi-
ty.202 However, as Paisley Livingston notes, "it is rather far-fetched to assume
that these persons were entirely successful in eliminating all intentions from
the process of writing, somehow scribbling for hours and days on end in a
somnabulistic and totally unreflective trance."203 Indeed, automatic writers
purposefully experimented with different techniques, and many of the result-
ing works were heavily edited before publication.20" The same is likely true of
artists. Notwithstanding dramatic claims about the unconscious nature of "the
creative act,"205 it is highly questionable that artists genuinely have no attitudes
relevant to the reception of their works at the time of creation.
To the extent that opponents of intentionalism maintain that intentional-
ism is invalid because interpreters cannot know artists' intentions with abso-
lute certainty, they place an extraordinarily, and perhaps unreasonably, high
epistemological burden on interpretation.206 in many contexts, including ordi-
nary communication, interpreters make judgments about agents' intentions
even though they cannot access their mental states directly. Yet anti-
intentionalists do not raise the same skepticism about these activities.20 7 In-
deed, many anti-intentionalist arguments - such as the claim that artists are
unable to know their unconscious attitudes - apply to viewers as much as art-
ists. Opponents of intentionalism do not convincingly explain why shifting the
focus of interpretation from artists to viewers would escape these problems.20
copyright and to decrease statutory damages if the "infringer was not aware and had no rea-
son to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement." 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012).
202. See, e.g., Barthes, supra note 5, at 144.
203. LIVINGSTON, supra note 103, at 36-37.
204. Id. at 37.
205. See, e.g., Marcel Duchamp, The Creative Act, in ROBERT LEBEL, MARCEL DUCHAMP 77
(George Heard Hamilton trans., Grove Press 1959).
206. In Anglo-American philosophy, the position that knowledge does not require absolute cer-
tainty, referred to as fallibilism, commands near universal acceptance. See, e.g., Stewart Co-
hen, How To Be a Fallibilist, 2 PHIL. PERSP. 91, 91 (1988). Similarly, many legal determina-
tions do not require judges or jurors to find that the defendant had a particular mental state
with absolute certainty, but rather that she did so beyond a reasonable doubt or by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.
207. See LIVINGSTON, supra note 103, at 146.
208. For similar reasons, some scholars have accused anti-intentionalists of selecting "epistemic
standards in a self-serving way, inconsistently imposing severe, risk-averse principles when
it comes to conjectures about authorial intentions." Id. at 146.
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Finally, some opponents of fair use concede that the debate between inten-
tionalism and anti-intentionalism is unsettled, but argue that courts should re-
ject intentionalism for precisely this reason. In their view, treating artists' tes-
timony in an intentionalist fashion amounts to taking sides. 20 9 However, that
argument cuts in both directions. Refusing to treat artists' testimony in an in-
tentionalist fashion, as opponents of intentionalism urge, requires the court to
take sides against intentionalism.21 o Why should courts take sides when doing
so favors anti-intentionalism, but not when the opposite is true?
To be clear, the purpose of this discussion is not to argue that anti-
intentionalists are wrong and that intentionalists are right. Indeed, anti-
intentionalists have other arguments at their disposal.21 ' But so do intentional-
ists. Rather than fairly present the complexities of this ongoing debate, oppo-
nents of intentionalism simply declare anti-intentionalism's victory. That as-
sessment might be appropriate in the future, but it does not accurately describe
the debate between intentionalism and anti-intentionalism as it exists today.2 12
3. Uncertainty
Appeals to uncertainty are also not compelling. Opponents of intentional-
ism argue that it creates inconsistent outcomes because it forces artists to testify
209. See Jasiewicz, supra note 13, at 167-68. Of course, there is nothing unusual about judges tak-
ing sides in aesthetic debates. Despite Justice Holmes's admonition in Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903), that judges should not act as art critics, see id. at 249-
5i, judges regularly make decisions about the classification and value of art, see Farley, supra
note 26.
210. To see why anti-intentionalist standards also require courts to take sides, consider the fol-
lowing example: Andrea, a photographer, sues Jeff, a painter, for copyright infringement.
Jeff raises a fair use defense, but urges the court to disregard his intentions. In response,
Andrea argues that Jeff's use is not transformative because Jeff intended to profit from his
painting, not to comment on Andrea's photograph. Both sides cite Jeff's deposition testimo-
ny, where he states that he intended to profit from the painting, but that he believes viewers'
perceptions, not his intentions, determine the work's meaning. Under these circumstances,
the court must inevitably take sides in the debate between intentionalism and anti-
intentionalism. Accepting Jeff's arguments would endorse his anti-intentionalism and, con-
sequently, deny Andrea's intentionalism.
21. For example, value-maximizing anti-intentionalists, see supra note 103, maintain that reasons
for adopting intentionalism must yield in the face of some greater aesthetic or ethical goal.
See DAvIES, supra note 6, at 155, 183-89. Accordingly, anti-intentionalists are not limited to
metaphysical or epistemological arguments of the kind discussed above. For a critical discus-
sion of anti-intentionalist value-maximizing arguments, see CARROLL, supra note 123, at 157-
8o.
212. On intentionalism's resilience, see Dutton, supra note i.
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about their intentions. In their view, artists are ineffective, unwilling, or unreli-
able witnesses.213 instead, they contend, courts should rely on art markets and
art experts to determine the significance of the defendant's use in relation to the
copyrighted work.214 However, as before, each of these arguments is dubious.
Arguments that intentionalism creates inconsistent outcomes are based
more on feelings than on evidence. Empirical studies suggest that transforma-
tive use has increased consistency generally. For example, Neil Natanel finds
that transformative use has imposed predictability on fair use determinations
by unifying analysis around a single standard.2 15 Similarly, scholars have
shown that courts make fair use determinations using consistent "patterns" or
"clusters."2 16 Although it is possible that contemporary art cases systematically
depart from these general trends, transformative use's general success in
achieving consistency weighs against its elimination.
Furthermore, the structure of the fair use test provides a plausible alterna-
tive explanation for inconsistencies. As with other multifactor balancing tests,
courts have strong strategic incentives to skew their analysis to ensure that eve-
ry fair use factor supports the outcome reached. 17 The more factors the court
finds in favor of its desired outcome, the less likely the court's decision will be
reversed on appeal. Accordingly, two courts facing works on either side of the
213. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 8, at 584-89; Jasciewicz, supra note 13, at 170-71.
214. See Adler, supra note 8, at 618-25; Jasciewicz, supra note 13, 172-80.
215. Netanel, supra note 48, at 737-46.
216. See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1525 (2004); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537
(2009).
217. Recent empirical scholarship emphasizes the role of strategic considerations in determining
judges' behavior. See Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, The Strategic Analysis of Judicial Decisions, 6
ANN. REV. L. & Soc. SCI. 341 (2010); Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Toward a Strategic Revolu-
tion in Judicial Politics: A Look Back, a Look Ahead, 53 POL. RES. Q. 625 (2000). Studies of dis-
trict court decisions are consistent with the hypothesis that district court judges attempt to
minimize the likelihood of reversal by, for example, adjusting their opinion-writing practic-
es. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi et al., What Do Federal District Judges Want? An Analysis of Publi-
cations, Citations, and Reversals, 28 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 518, 520-25, 531-45 (2011).
Apart from strategic incentives, Barton Beebe argues that judges' psychological
tendencies encourage them to resolve each factor in multifactor tests in the same direction.
See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94
CALF. L. REV. 1581, 1614-22 (2006). For example, in trademark cases, courts deciding
whether the defendant's use of the plaintiff's trademark is likely to cause confusion often
"stampede" the outcomes of individual test factors to favor the overall test outcome. See id.
Beebe attributes this phenomenon to judges' coherence-based reasoning, that is, the tenden-
cy to skew premises toward a chosen conclusion. See id. at 1615-17.
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fair use line are likely to reach different results with respect to all four factors,
even though the actual difference in status between the works may be small.218
Similarly, because fair use provides a complete defense to infringement lia-
bility, courts may split the difference by finding liability for one work, but not
another, even though a straightforward application of the fair use test would
not support this outcome. Just as courts engage in difference splitting by find-
ing for copyright owners on infringement, but denying an injunction,21 9 courts
may attempt to moderate their decisions through mixed liability findings.
As with stampeding, courts have strong strategic incentives to engage in
difference splitting. For example, courts may believe that denying the plaintiff
any remedy would be fair in cases like Cariou, where the defendant profited
significantly from the plaintiff's work.2 20 Alternately, difference splitting may
enable courts to maintain their legitimacy with both parties and encourage
compliance with their decisions.22 1 As before, these motivations create alterna-
tive sources of inconsistency, unrelated to intentionalism.
Opponents of intentionalism also do not convincingly explain why reliance
on artist testimony is particularly likely to cause uncertainty. In many cases,
parties must testify about their intentions even though they are unlikely to be
able to do so effectively. Some commentators believe that witness testimony is
systematically unreliable in adversarial frameworks because witnesses have
strategic incentives to lie and lawyers have strategic incentives to distort their
testimony.22 2 But this problem is endemic. There is no compelling reason why
the law should excuse artists from testifying when it does not afford the same
218. Suppose that a court must decide whether two works, A and B, are fair use. For both A and
B, factors one, two, and three weakly favor the plaintiff. However, for A, factor four strongly
favors the defendant, while for B, factor four favors the plaintiff. Consequently, the court
decides that A is fair use, but B is not. However, because the court wants to insulate its deci-
sion on appeal, the court's opinion resolves all four fair use factors in favor of the defendant
for A and all four fair use factors in favor of the plaintiff for B. As a result, the court's deci-
sions with respect to A and B are consistent, but its analysis of fair use factors is not. Deferen-
tial standards of review and the manipulability of concepts like "purpose;' see supra Section
II.B.2, make strategies of this kind easy to execute.
219. See Andrew Gilden, Copyright Essentialism and the Performativity of Remedies, 54 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 1123, 1169-73 (2013).
220. Indeed, the Second Circuit's decision in Cariou that some, but not all, of Prince's works were
protected by fair use suggests that the court might have attempted to split the difference in
that case. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3 d 694, 705-11 (2d Cir. 2013).
221. See MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND JUDICIALIZATION 63
(2002).
222. For an influential explanation of this view, see JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND
REALITY INAMERICAN JUSTICE 80-87 (1949).
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privilege to other parties, who may be equally ineffective or unreliable on the
stand.223
Whatever the disadvantages of intentionalism, adopting the alternative
strategies proposed by opponents would also produce uncertainty. Art markets,
suggests Amy Adler,22" are notoriously unstable. Behavioral irrationalities, in-
formation asymmetries, and poor liquidity all make art markets bad mecha-
nisms for determining the price of a defendant's work.225 For example, many
art purchases are made by private collectors, who tend to overvalue what they
own and not consider the opportunity costs of investing their assets in art over
alternatives. 2 26 Further, because top artworks are traded very infrequently, and
their prices are greatly affected by government interventions, such as export re-
strictions, sophisticated traders cannot cancel out the irrational trades of their
227
unsophisticated counterparts. Thus, an artwork's price may reflect nothing
more than the idiosyncratic preferences of an individual purchaser.
Art experts fare no better.228 Even within anti-intentionalist schools, art
critics do not agree on basic methods and principles of analysis, much less the
meaning of individual works. 2 29 Indeed, Walter Gallie described the very cate-
223. Furthermore, artist testimony, even if unsuccessful, might be an important contributor to
social change. As Douglas Nejaime shows, plaintiffs asserting civil rights claims often suc-
ceed through a process of "winning through losing." See Douglas Nejaime, Winning Through
Losing, 96 IowA L. REV. 941 (2011). Historically, sexual and religious minorities have used
litigation losses to construct organizational identities and mobilize outraged constituents,
while appealing to other state actors and the public. See id. at 969-72. The history of trans-
formative use parallels this phenomenon. Koons lost in Rogers, but went on to win in
Blanch. See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d
Cir. 1992). And in Cariou, the Second Circuit embraced an even broader interpretation of
transformative use. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
224. See Adler, supra note 8, at 618-25.
225. See Reiner Eichenberger, Art Investment Returns, in BRUNO S. FREY, ARTS & ECONOMICS:
ANALYSIS & CULTURAL POLICY 168-71 (2d ed. 2003). For introductory discussion of these
phenomena and their effects on the valuation of goods, see N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCI-
PLES OF ECONOMICS 462-66, 471-76, 610-30 (7 th ed. 2015).
226. See Bruno S. Frey & Reiner Eichenberger, On the Rate of Return in the Art Market: Survey and
Evaluation, 39 EUR. ECON. REv. 528, 532 (1995).
227. See id. at 532-33. According to the admittedly idealized "efficient. market hypothesis," prices
in an efficient market reflect all readily available public information because competition
causes new information to be instantly reflected in actual prices. See Eugene F. Fama, The
Behavior of Stock Market Prices, 38 J. BuS. 34, 90 (1965).
228. See Jasciewicz, supra note 13.
229. See KERR HOUSTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO ART CRITICISM: HISTORIES, STRATEGIES, VOICES
(2013).
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gory of art as a quintessential "essentially contested concept" 2 3 0 -that is, a con-
cept subject to endless disputes that, "although not resolvable by argument of
any kind, are nevertheless sustained by perfectly respectable arguments and ev-
idence." 231 Even if these disputes did not foreclose art critic testimony out-
right,23 2 plaintiffs could exploit them to introduce favorable testimony on fair
use. 233 In short, moving from artist testimony to any of the proposed alterna-
tives would substitute one imperfect system for another.
III. WHITHER TRANSFORMATIVE USE?
So far, this Note has argued that intentionalism protects important First
Amendment principles and that none of the arguments raised by opponents of
intentionalism are compelling. How should copyright law proceed? Sections
III.A and III.B present two strategies for preserving intentionalism within the
fair use inquiry, while acknowledging the concerns raised by opponents. While
superficially similar to existing approaches, both strategies provide an organiz-
ing framework for making transformative use determinations that preserves
reference to the defendant's intentions while avoiding the full force of anti-
intentionalist arguments. Both strategies also have comparative advantages,
which courts 'will need to evaluate in developing transformative use doctrine.
Section III.C anticipates objections that the proposed strategies would un-
dermine the economic principles underlying copyright law. In particular, pro-
ponents of strong intellectual property rights protections might worry that
granting defendants greater protections based on their intentions would un-
dercut copyright owners' incentives to create. In fact, neither strategy is likely
to reduce creative output. And, depending on assumptions, granting artists
230. WB. Gallie, Art as an Essentially Contested Concept, 6 PHIL. Q. 97 (1956).
231. WB. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y 167, 169 (1956).
232. Proponents of art critics do not explain how art criticism could satisfy the requirements for
admissible expert testimony established by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509
U.S. 579 (1993), and Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). Isia Jasciewicz ar-
gues that art critics would qualify as experts because their "specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact at issue." Jasciewicz, supra
note 13, at 175-76 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702). However, as Kuhmo Tire recognized, some
disciplines, such as astrology, simply lack the reliability needed to meet this standard. See
526 U.S. at 151.
233. As with other forms of testimony, adversarialism tends to distort truth seeking by magnify-
ing differences in opinion. See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 1113,
1185. Even when expert testimony is reliable, factfinders discount its probative value because
they assume that experts are biased. See Christopher Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 184-88 (2010).
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greater freedoms to explore the objects of their intentions may increase the
amount or quality of art produced.
A. Dual Standards
One strategy that courts could pursue would be to adopt expressly both in-
tentionalist and anti-intentionalist standards for determining transformative
use. Under this dual standards strategy, courts would ask both whether the de-
fendant intended to transform the copyrighted work and whether the accused
work was actually transformative. Lay or expert testimony (to the extent that it
could be deemed reliable) could assist the latter inquiry, according to the strat-
egies proposed by opponents of intentionalism.m' Currently, courts examine
both the defendant's intentions and the accused work's content in determining
transformativeness, but they do so haphazardly, without any organizing
framework to guide their analysis. Under a dual standards strategy, findings of
transformativeness under either standard would weigh in favor of fair use.
This strategy would have several advantages over alternatives proposed by
opponents of intentionalism. First, such a strategy would accommodate the
concerns of both intentionalists and anti-intentionalists. Combining intention-
alist and anti-intentionalist standards would recognize the need to avoid inter-
fering with the defendant's communicative aims, which are present in the de-
fendant's intentions, while at the same time recognizing that the aesthetic
debate between intentionalism and anti-intentionalism remains unsettled and
that viewers might have residual interests in determining the meaning or sig-
nificance of the defendant's work, independent of what the defendant might
intend."' Accordingly, a dual standards strategy would give both artists and
viewers an opportunity to influence the outcome of the fair use analysis in par-
ticular cases.236
Second, a dual standards strategy would provide superior ex ante predicta-
bility to potential defendants than pure anti-intentionalist approaches would.
An artist deciding whether to create a potentially infringing work would know
that she could rely on her intention to transform the original work as a defense
to liability. Absent this, the same artist would need to predict the critical or
234. Even if art experts were found insufficiently reliable to testify on the meanings of particular
works, see supra note 232, they might nevertheless testify as to whether artists' purported in-
tentions were plausible, given their knowledge of other artists.
235. See supra Sections II.B.i, II.B.2.
236. Robert Cover famously portrayed the legal process as an essentially competitive one in
which different groups struggle for control over the law's meaning. See Robert M. Cover,
The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1983).
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commercial reception of the work, placing her in a much more precarious posi-
237tion.
Third, a dual standards strategy would provide a more organized and de-
fensible approach than those currently in use by the courts. As Sections o.o and
o.o explain, individual courts have held the defendant's intentions or the ac-
cused work's content to be sufficient evidence of transformative use, even
where one is present and the other is not.238 However, they have done so unre-
flectively, without explaining when or why courts should find these factors de-
cisive. A dual standards strategy would provide a general framework for organ-
izing these decisions, reducing apparent inconsistencies. 239 At the same time, a
dual standards strategy could acknowledge the arguments that motivate inten-
tionalism and anti-intentionalism without resorting to the extreme positions
present in some decisions. 24 0
Of course, such a strategy would have detractors. Plaintiffs might argue
that the use of both intentionalist and anti-intentionalist standards would pro-
vide too much protection for defendants, discouraging creators from producing
original works. The strength of this argument depends, ultimately, on the ex-
tent to which copyright law (and competing principles, such as free speech)
should protect first- and second-generation-creators. 241' But in any event, courts
could moderate the harshness of the proposed strategy on plaintiffs by reduc-
ing the weight of a finding of transformativeness on the ultimate fair use de-
termination. In other words, a finding of transformativeness would not neces-
sarily be dispositive under either standard.242
237. See supra Section II.B.3.
238. See supra Sections I.B, I.C.
239. As noted, the Second Circuit's explanation in Castle Rock Entertainment- that the defendant's
intentions can provide sufficient evidence of transformativeness even if she does not alter the
content of the original work -is difficult to reconcile with its holding in Cariou -that trans-
formativeness depends on "how the work in question appears to the reasonable observer,
not simply what an artist might say about a particular piece or body of work." Compare Cas-
tle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Grp., Inc., i5o F.3 d 132 (2d Cit. 1998), with Cariou v.
Prince, 714 F.3 d 694, 707 (2d Cir. 2014).
240. See sources cited supra note 239.
241. For further discussion, see infra Section III.C.
242. This is consistent with Campbell's characterization of transformative use as important to, but
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B. Categorial Intentionalism
A second strategy that courts could pursue would be to adopt a "categorial
intentionalist" standard for determining transformativeness. Unlike the dual
standards strategy described above, categorial intentionalism would impose a
single standard for determining transformativeness. Such a strategy would
adopt an intermediate approach between absolute intentionalism and absolute
anti-intentionalism, preserving the benefits of both extremes. As a form of in-
tentionalism, categorial intentionalism maintains that the actual artist's inten-
tions are relevant to the work's meaning. However, unlike absolute intentional-
ism, categorial intentionalism would limit the kinds of intentions that
interpreters may consider.
Recall from Part II that, on Levinson's influential account, categorial inten-
tions describe the author's intentions regarding how the work is to be "classi-
fied, taken, [or] approached," including the author's intentions that the work
be considered as an example of a particular genre. 24 3 According to Levinson, a
work's meaning depends on the intentions that an ideal audience would attrib-
ute to the work's author. 244 That ideal audience, in turn, is defined by the actual
author's categorial intentions regarding the work. Thus, interpreters may per-
missibly rely on the author's categorial intentions because they "virtually can-
not fail." 24 5 For example, an artist who creates a painting and intends that
painting to be a work of abstract art almost always succeeds in doing so.
However, Levinson breaks from absolute intentionalists by prohibiting ref-
erence to the artist's semantic intentions. Unlike categorial intentions, semantic
intentions - the artist's intentions "to mean something in or by" a particular
work-are unreliable. 24 6 An artist may intend for her painting to represent that
"the mass production of commodities and media images has caused a deterio-
ration in the quality of society."24 7 However, she may be utterly unsuccessful in
doing so if, for example, she chooses to situate that painting in a context that
evinces tenderheartedness. Given this asymmetry in fallibility, semantic inten-
tions "do not determine meaning, but categorial intentions, such as concern a
literature maker's basic conception of what is made, do in general determine
243. Levinson, supra note 114, at 232; see also supra notes 195-198 and accompanying text.
244. See Levinson, supra note 114. For critical analysis, see DAVIEs, supra note 6, at 166-90; LIv-
INGSTON, supra note 103, at 135-74; and STECKER, supra note 6, at 123-41.
245. Levinson, supra note 114, at 232.
246. Id.
247. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 1992).
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how a text is to be conceptualized and approached on a fundamental level and
thus indirectly affect what it will resultingly say or express."24 8
Consequently, categorial intentionalism would require transformative use
determinations to follow a two-stage process. First, parties would introduce
evidence of the defendant's categorial intentions, such as those regarding genre
and setting. Evidence of the defendant's semantic intentions would be exclud-
ed. Second, parties would contest whether the accused work was transforma-
tive given those intentions. Over time, courts could develop rules for determin-
ing which kinds of intentions satisfied this requirement and which kinds of
evidence could be introduced to establish those intentions.
As with the dual standards strategy, this approach would provide a more
organized and defensible approach than courts' current approaches, helping to
eliminate apparent inconsistencies in case outcomes. Although, as Blanch
demonstrates, courts sometimes rely on evidence of the defendant's categorial
intentions, such as the defendant's intention to display the accused work in a
particular gallery,24 9 they do so unsystematically, and without distinguishing
those intentions from other, more abstract intentions, such as the defendant's
intention to parody the copyrighted work. Adopting a categorial intentionalist
strategy would give courts firm instructions about which intentions to consider
and which to ignore, while providing a theoretical foundation for these choices.
The advantages and disadvantages of categorial intentionalism would be
similar to those of the dual standards strategy. Like the dual standards strategy,
categorial intentionalism would respect the defendant's communicative aims,
even where those aims conflicted with viewers' responses to the accused work.
Similarly, categorial intentionalism would provide greater ex ante predictability
to artists by allowing them to insulate their activities from liability by taking
steps to establish works as belonging to a particular genre or by associating
those work with others that express a particular, critical message. Also like the
dual standards strategy, categorial intentionalism might overprotect defendants
at plaintiffs' expense. But again, courts could moderate the potential harshness
of this strategy by reducing the weight of a finding of transformativeness with-
in the fair use inquiry.
However, categorial intentionalism would result in a different balance be-
tween artists' and viewers' interests than would a dual standards strategy.
Whereas the dual standards strategy would respect artists' categorial and se-
mantic intentions, categorial intentionalism would respect only the former.
Given this, the First Amendment principles discussed in Section II.B.1 may
248. Levinson, supra note 114, at 233.
249. See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F-3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 20o6).
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make this approach impermissible to the extent that the First Amendment pro-
tects the artist's communicative aims, which would include her semantic aims.
Still, respecting the artist's categorial intentions might be sufficient because it
provides at least some protection. And even if categorial intentionalism's failure
to respect artists' semantic intentions might raise autonomy concerns, this
might not be troubling in the case of artists who, like Prince, disavow having a
transformative purpose.
Which of these considerations dominate is a question that courts will need
to answer in attempting to implement these strategies. For now, it is enough to
state that the choice between intentionalism and anti-intentionalism is not an
all-or-nothing proposition. To the extent that anti-intentionalist arguments
raise concerns, courts can choose to adopt both intentionalist and anti-
intentionalist standards or restrict the range of intentions upon which defend-
ants may rely.
C. Incentives To Create
According to the standard economic theory of intellectual property, copy-
right systems exist to encourage creative production. Because creative works,
like other information goods, have high fixed costs and low marginal costs -
they are expensive to produce and cheap to copy -creators selling in competi-
tive markets may not be able to recover their investments.2 so Copyright systems
attempt to solve this perceived problem by allowing creators to exclude com-
petitors for fixed periods of time, allowing those creators to charge higher pric-
es than would otherwise be possible.2 '
Against this backdrop, some might worry that, by increasing the scope of
protections afforded to defendants, the strategies proposed in Sections III.A
and III.B would reduce prospective creators' expected profits and, therefore,
their incentives to create. However, even if intentionalist standards were sys-
tematically more protective than anti-intentionalist ones, there are several rea-
sons to doubt that either proposal would significantly retard creative produc-
tion.
Significantly, the standard theory assumes that prospective creators are ra-
tional wealth-maximizing individuals, whose primary concern is to maximize
25o. For explanations of the standard theory, see, for example, LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOM-
IC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw, supra note 38, at 294-333; ROBERT P. MERG-
ES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 11-24 (6th ed. 2012);
and Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 38. The Intellectual
Property Clause arguably constitutionalizes the standard theory. See supra note 145.
251. See sources cited supra note 250.
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the economic returns on their labor investments. But that assumption is ques-
tionable. Drawing on economics, psychology, and other disciplines, a growing
number of legal scholars argue that artists and other creators are intrinsically
motivated to create artistic works, without the need for copyright systems and
other external incentives.252 Relying on external incentives may even reduce
creative output. For example, Bruno Frey theorizes that extrinsic interventions,
such as copyright systems, may crowd out intrinsically motivated creators, who
would otherwise flourish.2 53 Practical barriers make Frey's theory difficult to
evaluate.254 But if he is correct, granting artists greater freedom to pursue the
objects of their intentions may result in more or higher quality art.
Furthermore, even if creators are perfectly rational wealth-maximizers, as
the standard theory assumes, granting greater fair use protections will often
have no effect on prospective creators' expected returns. This is because de-
mand for the copyright owner's work and the defendant's work are frequently
unrelated.255 A buyer interested in Rogers's $200 photograph is unlikely to be
interested in Koons's $367,000 painting, and vice versa. Although some in-
vestments may be unprofitable absent revenues from derivative works, it is un-
clear whether this is true for the majority of cases, or even a substantial minori-
ty. 256
Relatedly, the effect of greater fair use protections on overall creative pro-
duction, the ultimate goal of the copyright system under the standard theory,
would be at the very least ambivalent. To the extent that the proposals would
decrease first-generation creators' incentives, they would also increase second-
generation creators' incentives to transform those works in potentially artisti-
cally valuable ways. 2 57 This tradeoff is especially acute for areas like appropria-
252. See, e.g., Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
623 (2012); Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51
WM. & MARY L. REv. 513, 515 (2009).
253. See FREY, supra note 225, at 141-55; BRUNO S. FREY, NOT JUST FOR THE MONEY: AN ECONOM-
IC THEORY OF PERSONAL MOTIVATION 7-39 (1997).
254. See Ruth Towse, Copyright and Artists: A View from Cultural Economics, 20 J. ECON. SURVS.
567, 579-80 (20o6).
255. See LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra
note 38, at 11o.
256. See id.
257. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L.
REv. 989 (1997). For discussion of similar issues in patent law and policy, see, for example,
Jerry R. Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation, 26
RAND J. ECON. 20 (1995); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumula-
tive Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991).
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tion art, where first-generation creators are poorly positioned to create second-
generation works because of their destructive or critical character.
Whether, in the final analysis, greater fair use protections would produce
more or higher quality art is a difficult empirical and normative question. It is
empirically difficult because the optimal balance between first- and second-
generation creators' incentives is hard to measure and normatively difficult be-
cause the relative artistic value of first- and second-generation works is contest-
ed.258 Thus, objecting to greater fair use protections because they would de-
crease copyright owners' incentives is premature without first establishing their
role within the broader process of creative production.
Finally, even if stronger fair use protections did, on balance, reduce copy-
right owners' incentives, many prospective creators would still retain powerful
incentives to continue production even in the face of copying. The prospect of
obtaining a monopoly is not the only, or even most powerful, economic incen-
tive available to prospective creators. Copyright owners would still benefit from
lead-time advantages, and many would derive economic benefits, such as
goodwill, that are only weakly affected by copying. 259 As with inter-
generational effects, the significance of these non-intellectual property incen-
tives is not fully understood, but, as before, they weaken the force of the eco-
nomic worry.
CONCLUSION
Commentators who oppose transformative use's "intentionalism" are
wrong to argue that anti-intentionalism provides unequivocally greater protec-
tion for art. If the defendant intends to transform the copyrighted work, but
viewers do not perceive the accused work as transformed, only an intentionalist
standard will protect her against liability. Moreover, in those circumstances,
anti-intentionalist standards create potential First Amendment problems. Both
doctrine and theory suggest that an artist's intentions should be at least rele-
vant to the question of whether she is liable for the harmful effects of her
speech.
Moreover, opponents of intentionalism are wrong to declare anti-
intentionalism's victory as an aesthetic theory. In fact, the debate between in-
258. Indeed, appropriation art attempts to challenge traditional values of creativity and originali-
ty. See Greenberg, supra note 74; Brad Sherman, Appropriating the Postmodern: Copyright and
the Challenge of the New, 4 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 31 (1995).
259. Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and
Computer Programs, 87 HARv. L. REV. 281, 299-307 (1970); Landes & Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 38, at 330-31.
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tentionalism and anti-intentionalism outside of copyright law is much more
complex. Whether anti-intentionalism ultimately triumphs is a question best
answered by philosophy and the critical disciplines. At the moment, anti-
intentionalism's victory over intentionalism is not nearly as decisive as oppo-
nents suggest. And, as Dennis Dutton explains in the epigraph to this Note, the
answer to that question is unlikely to emerge in the near future.260
Opponents of intentionalism often assert that copyright law should broadly
allow artistic copying.2 61 Perhaps they are right. Perhaps fair use should pro-
vide greater protection for art or even exempt all artistic works from liability.
After all, copying is rampant in the art world, and some artists have produced
their most celebrated works by borrowing from their predecessors.2 62 But these
arguments transcend the debate over intentionalism, and should be considered
on their own merits, without one-sided reference to aesthetic theory.
260. See Dutton, supra note 1, at 194.
261. Adler, for example, unabashedly declares in the first line of her article that "when it comes to
art, I believe in copying." Adler, supra note 8, at 561.
262. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
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